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I.

INTRODUCTION

According to popular understanding, America rose to the forefront of the international
system when the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) marked the end of the Cold War era singling
America out as the world‟s only superpower. However, although no serious scholar whatever
his/her background dares underestimate the significance of the Cold War and the bipolar
nature of the international system during this four-decade phase of history, America‟s share
of the global economy actually reached its peak during the 1950s in the midst of the Cold
War and shortly following the end of the Second World War. Ever since then, it is a matter of
fact that America‟s share of the global economy has been gradually declining, as confirmed
by a multitude of indicators.

In the 1970s, in the wake of the abandonment of the Gold Standard (1971), the oil crisis and
ensuing stagflation that followed in the American economy (1973), and America‟s failure in
the Vietnam War (1975), numerous scholars, most notably Charles Kindleberger, argued that
America has entered a phase of hegemonic decline. Throughout the 1980s and thereafter,
those views on American decline have been shared by various scholars from different
backgrounds, most notably hegemonic stability theorists, classical and neo- realists and
world-systems theorists. However, other scholars refuted this assertion claiming, albeit for
different reasons, that American power is actually stable if not increasing.

As such, as the Cold War drew to an end, the real debate in the international relations,
political economy and economic history literature, pertaining to American power, was not
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whether America was ascending to hegemony but rather whether it was descending from it.
The major proponents of American decline include Charles Kindleberger, Stephan Krasner,
Robert Gilpin, Robert Keohane, Immanuel Wallerstein and Paul Kennedy; faced by
opposition from the likes of Susan Strange, Bruce Russet and Joseph Nye, who assert that
American hegemony remains stable.

The „declinists‟ mainly argue (a) that America‟s share of the world‟s wealth and power have
declined and are continuing to decline from their 1950s levels, (b) that America is suffering
from huge trade and budget deficits, and (c) that it is suffering from imperial overstretch.
Their rivals, conversely, argue (a) that America‟ share of the global economy has declined
relative to other economic powers mainly as a result of the reinvigoration of Western Europe
and Japan after the end of the Second World War (actually an American foreign policy
objective during the Cold War) and lately as a result of the growth of developing country
economies (especially China), (b) that America continues to retain significant forms of power
(„structural power‟ and (potentially) „soft power‟) even though its power resources might
have relatively declined, and (c) that there is no clear challenger to American hegemony, as
Europe lacks the will, and China and Russia the ability, to challenge America, at least on the
short to medium term.

Major events on the international political and economic arenas, such as the fall of the Berlin
Wall (1989), the liberation of Kuwait by an American-led international coalition in the
Second Gulf War (1991), the September 11th attacks (2001), the American nearly unilateral
invasion of Iraq (2003), and most recently the financial meltdown in the American economy
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(2008), have sparked renewed interest in this debate, whether in the direction of adding
confidence in the longevity of America‟s hegemony or in the opposite direction of increasing
anxiety over America‟s predicament.

Undoubtedly, the financial crash of 2008, which hit the American economy very hard, has
renewed interest in the topic. Although, as events unfolded, the United States recovered
faster than many expected, the financial meltdown serves as a reminder that America‟s
power, which is founded on a vibrant economy, is more volatile than what is sometimes
generally assumed, much like the September 11th attacks highlighted America‟s vulnerability
in the security realm.

From the empirical standpoint, the declinists‟ assertion that America‟s share of the global
economy, relative to those of other actors, is declining from its 1950s level is true; and this is
a general pattern that does not relate to any particular financial crisis. However, the real
problem that this research attempts to analyze is determining the effect, if any, said relative
decline in America's power base has had, and continues to have, on America's actual power
in the international system and global economy.

Determining whether or not American power is on the decline is of paramount importance in
formulating a clear understanding of international relations and the global economy for
numerous reasons, and mainly because, according to declinist literature, (a) American
hegemonic decline explains instability in the global economy and calls for predicting even
greater instability, and (b) American decline, and more particularly American anxiety over
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decline, is most likely going to result in a serious challenge to American hegemony and
hence to instability in the international system, if not a great power war or the collapse of the
international system as we know it.

Conversely, if the assumption that American power is declining is refuted, then (a) the causes
of instability in the international system and global economy must be explained in a different
manner, and most likely in light of American policies which create, and sometimes willingly,
such instability, and (b) the predictions of the disintegration of American hegemony and/or
the international system must be called into question.

It is also important to understand that the debate between the declinists and their opponents is
not merely theoretical, as it is also a debate over American policy and, especially, the
directions the U.S. should take in formulating its foreign policy. The belief in the decline of
American power is, more often than not, used as a pretext for the unilateralism and/or
isolationism needed to avoid such decline, while confidence in the longevity of American
hegemony calls for more American openness and responsibility to the world.

4

II.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

There are several important theoretical approaches to the question of hegemony and
power in the international system and global economy, most notably hegemonic stability
theory which focuses on the interplay between hegemony and global economic stability, Paul
Kennedy‟s “realist” approach to the history of international relations emphasizing on patterns
for the rise and fall of great powers, and Immanuel Wallerstein‟s “systemic” approach which
is more focused on patterns in the international system as a whole.

A. HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY AND ITS REVISIONS AND CRITICISMS

Any discussion of American power, or potential hegemonic decline, cannot ignore the
rich literature on the theory of hegemonic stability, which in fact is the dominant discourse
on the issue. Perhaps, David Lake‟s remarks on this theory best describe it as an attempt to
explain “periods of relative international openness” through the “existence of a single
dominant economic power”.1

Two of the earliest proponents of this theory are Robert Gilpin and Stephan Krasner, who
both stress that “hegemony is prerequisite to the emergence of a liberal trade regime”.2
According to Arthur Stein, Gilpin‟s approach is based on the argument that a hegemon‟s
power is based on economic efficiency (therefore guaranteeing it the most gains from free
trade) and political/military power (resources used to induce or coerce others into adopting

1
2

Lake 1991, 106.
Stein 1984, 357.

5

free trade).3 In other words, only a hegemonic power is in a position whereby free trade is
both desirable and achievable.

An example of Gilpin‟s approach is how he stresses that multinational corporations, far from
being a threat to American hegemony, exist because the United States has created the
“necessary political framework” that enabled the “technological” and “economic” factors that
brought them into existence to operate, and his subsequent conclusion that this
predominantly “American phenomenon” would seize to “reign over international economic
relations” if American power is challenged.4

Another important figure in the development of this theory is Charles Kindleberger. One of
the main issues he brings forward is the differentiation between the concepts of “leadership”
(legitimized through “persuasion” rather than “domination”) and that of “coercion /
exploitation” as the central theme of hegemony.5 He also argues that the international system
during the period of American hegemony, although organized through “international
institutions” on the surface, was in fact maintained through American leadership.6 In
addition, Kindleberger emphasizes the merits of “benevolent despotism”, and stresses on the
huge costs (“undue share of burdens of international public good”, to use his words) to the
hegemon of maintaining such benevolence, and the difficulty to resist the temptation to move

3

Ibid.
Stein 1984, 404-19.
5
Kindleberger 1976, 31-4.
6
Ibid.
4
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towards “illegitimate” and “exploitative” dominance, leading to the loss of leadership in the
process.7

An important distinction, however, needs to be made between Gilpin and Krasner on the one
hand and Kindleberger on the other hand. The latter emphasizes the “provision of the
collective good of international stability” as the main foundation of the causal relationship
between hegemony and stability, whereas the first two add the creation of an “international
regime” fulfilling the “security needs” (social stability, political power, and economic
growth) of nations, particularly the hegemon, as another explanatory variable.8 Consequently,
Kindleberger‟s definition of the international economic structure takes only one dimension
(relative economic size of actors) into account while the other two consider political-military
elements as well upon examining the distribution of global economic power.9

In spite of their minor differences, the majority of hegemonic stability scholars are of the
view that there are two main historical episodes of hegemony: the Pax Britannica period of
the mid-nineteenth century and the Pax Americana period of the mid-twentieth century.10
They also share a belief that American hegemony is steadily declining, and use the changes
in the global political economy of the 1970s decade, especially Dollar devaluation, as
evidence to support this argument.

7

Kindleberger 1976, 35-8.
Lake 1991, 145.
9
Ibid.
10
Krasner 1976, 332.
8
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Actually, the hegemonic stability theory did not arouse much interest before the events of the
early 1970s drew scholarly attention to the topic. As David Rapkin puts it, only when
hegemonic decline became plausible did this discourse become fashionable.11 Since then, it
has occupied a dominant position in the debate on American decline, rising in significance
during periods of stagnation and whenever a challenge is deemed eminent or a challenger
serious and retreating from the scene during eras of stability and vitality. And also since then,
this approach has been subject to repeated revisions, reservations, and critiques, which need
to be explored before the validity of its proponents‟ conclusions can be examined.

One of the drawbacks of the hegemonic stability theory, highlighted by David Lake, is its
rather superficial assumption of similarity among historical cases of hegemony, particularly
Pax Britannica and Pax Americana, and accordingly the assumption of similar patterns of
hegemonic decline. Lake argues that the processes of rise and decline are very different in the
British and American cases. He, more importantly, emphasizes the different approach each of
those hegemons had/has to promoting free trade: Great Britain‟s commitment to free trade
under all circumstances, as opposed to the American policy of “reciprocity” employed
through controlling access to the U.S. market coupled with America‟s willingness to exert
pressure through its international power.12

Moreover, Lake asserts that issues such as the “institutionalization of international economic
regimes”, the “overlap between security and economic issues”, and the importance of
“foreign direct investment”, all point to the fact that international economic liberalism will

11
12

Rapkin 1990, 1.
Lake 1991, 114.
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survive independent of American hegemonic decline, unlike its decay parallel to British
decline.13 This is an example of the liberal response to the hegemonic stability theory.
Liberals argue that international regimes have a life of their own, and therefore they conclude
that the current global free trade regime can survive past American hegemony.

In a rather clever endnote, Lake implies that simplistic readings of history can lead to the
adoption of aggressive trade policies and isolationism.14 He recognizes that a dangerous
correlation between theory and policy sometimes exists, whereby theory could very well be
developed as a pretext for forwarding particular policies or strategies. Hence, he draws
attention to the possibility of questioning the integrity of the hegemonic stability approach.

Another major critique of the theory is that of Arthur Stein. He attacks one of its central
foundations: the assumption that hegemonic powers are willing and able to establish an
atmosphere of international liberalism. According to him, a hegemon might pursue an
isolationist policy for domestic reasons (a factor completely overlooked or at least rarely
visited in the hegemonic stability literature).15 Furthermore, he makes the intelligent point
that the role of other players is usually ignored: on the one hand it is not easy to impose free
trade upon them by the hegemon, and similarly, on the other hand, the hegemon‟s decline
cannot automatically lead to a global isolationist environment (hegemons, after all, “can
close only their borders, not those of others”).16

13

Lake 1991, 118-9.
Ibid.
15
Stein 1984, 359.
16
Stein 1984, 386.
14
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A few other scholars challenge the hegemonic stability approach through highlighting its
deficiency as a universal explanation. For example, upon examining the changes in
international economic regimes during the period 1967-1977, Robert Keohane, rather than
presenting an outright criticism of the theory, argues that it is more meaningful in explaining
changes in some issue areas compared to others. He claims that the decline in U.S. power
during said period explains developments in the international oil regime better than the
monetary regime, and much better than the trade regime.17 And, therefore, he calls for
enhancing the theory by examining domestic factors and understanding its varying degree of
applicability to different issues.

Similarly, upon investigating the liberalization of free trade in nineteenth century Arabia, in
an attempt to empirically test the theory, Fred Lawson, reaches the conclusion that the
validity of this approach can largely be questioned on the grounds of lack of applicability to
cases, in different temporal, and more importantly, regional contexts.18 He argues that
structural frameworks like hegemonic stability should hold under empirical scrutiny, as their
nature is supposedly global and all-encompassing. His findings suggest that, contrary to
hegemonic stability expectations, trade liberalization in nineteenth century Arabia was a
function of regional and global competition rather than hegemonic power.19 In addition,
Lawson provides an alternative explanation for the cycles of trade openness and closure in
the Arab region. He argues that British policy towards the region was dictated by a strategy
of guaranteeing military and economic security that varied with time, depending on changes
in British interests that were not always consistent with free trade.
17

Keohane 1980, 154.
Lawson 1983, 320.
19
Lawson 1983, 330.
18
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Accordingly, he reaches two main conclusions: (a) that hegemonic stability is a mainly
Eurocentric rather than genuinely universal; and (b) that, in the light of the case he considers,
a wider definition of hegemony, which tackles the hegemon‟s resource manipulation and not
only the global distribution of capabilities, is required.

Some other scholars outline major inherent flaws in the theoretical foundations of the
hegemonic stability theory, arguing that free trade, as a „public good‟, cannot be outlined as
the independent variable bringing about the desirability of international economic openness.
For example, Peter Cowhey and Edward Long, propose “surplus capacity” as an alternative
explanation. According to them, some nations experience excess production in a number of
their key industrial sectors, as a result of going through periods of structural adjustment.
They argue that during historical phases were several major economic powers simultaneously
confront this problem, in a number of key industrial sectors, the likelihood of reaching tacit
agreements on protection through bargaining increases.20 Alternatively, during other periods
where this problem is less pervasive, the attractiveness of liberalizing trade is pronounced,
and domestic interest groups are relatively ignored. Thus, they are of the view that “surplus
capacity” better explains cycles of trade openness and closure compared to the simplistic
assumption of a “public good” nature of free trade.

Approaching the same issue, John Conybeare argues that free trade is not always a public
good, or the best strategy to pursue by all states, particularly hegemonic powers. He holds the
view that as a result of rivalries and inequalities, the extraction of rents from, and may be
even the exploitation of, small powers, could dissuade major powers from opting for truly
20

Cowhey and Long 1983, 162.
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free trade (which in that case will be less rewarding).21 Conybeare, therefore, warns against
the detrimental influence of apparently simplistic interpretations of the classical and neoclassical free trade literature on the hegemonic stability discourse. 22 Arguing along similar
lines, Joanne Gowa claims that “security externalities” of decisions on whether or not to
pursue free trade policies have to be put into consideration.23 She draws attention to the fact
that the key role of security issues is largely left out of the hegemonic stability framework,
although they are of paramount importance to trade liberalization.

Two other major critics of the hegemonic stability theory, who both challenge some of its
major underlying assumptions more directly, are Duncan Snidal and Bruce Russet. Snidal
attacks the theory‟s postulation of an “equitable distribution of benefits” from international
economic liberalism or, in short, the “publicness of cooperation”.24 He argues that hegemonic
stability has benefited industrial nations and “sectoral” monopolies (such as oil-producing
states) more than “Third and Fourth World states”.25

Another point he makes is that the conclusions of those examining American decline mix up
“decrease in order” and “decrease in American control over order”.26 Consequently, he
argues that hegemonic decline (leading to decline in stability, as the theory would contend)
might be remedied through “hegemonic cooperation”.27 Snidal basically claims that the
“collective action” of a few major powers can preserve order and stability in the absence of
21

Conybeare 1984, 13.
Ibid.
23
Gowa 1989, 308.
24
Snidal 1985, 315-6.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
22
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hegemony. To put it differently, he is of the belief that a hegemonic class of major powers
can possibly substitute the hegemonic power in playing a stabilizing role on the global
economic scene.

Russet comments similarly on the issue of benefit distribution, contending that in the
American case of hegemony, the U.S. had a disproportionate share of the benefits from
hegemony (not a disproportionate share of the burdens of its costs, as Kindleberger argues).28
Building upon this, he argues that those gains (particularly, “cultural hegemony”) help the
United States maintain its position on the international arena.29 According to him, cultural
hegemony enables the U.S. to “control outcomes” without having to “exert overt control over
others”.30

All of those criticisms are valuable in outlining the weaknesses of the hegemonic stability
theory, yet none of them (even Snider‟s and Russet‟s), cut to the heart of the matter, by
attacking the core of this theory, which is exactly what Susan Strange does. To begin with,
Strange is of the view that a “myth” of decline is used to create an atmosphere of pessimism
and therefore isolationism, or apathy towards the thus deemed inevitable “lack of
international cooperation and feebleness of international organizations”.31 More importantly,
she argues that the rise and fall in the significance of this theory can only be understood as a
manifestation of the outcome of the battle between “liberal” and “realist” trends in U.S.
foreign policy, and therefore she claims that it becomes much more important in periods of

28

Russet 1985, 208.
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
31
Strange 1987, 552-4.
29
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American “isolationism” and “unilateralism”, independent of whether American power is
actually declining or not.32 Finally, she casts doubt on the causal relationship between
economic instability and hegemonic decline, claiming that the truth of the matter is that
American belief in the “myth” of decline (and not actual decline in American hegemony),
un-innocently coinciding with periods of isolationist foreign policy, is itself an important
cause of instability.33

Of equal significance is Strange‟s critique of regime analysis (a major component of most
theories of hegemonic stability). She actually highlights several drawbacks of this analytical
approach, but the most important of those is her assertion that it represents a mere “shift of
fashion”, if not American taste, regarding international relations.34 According to her,
Americans “exaggerate the shocks of the 1970s”, portraying them as a loss of a previous
stability coinciding with a decline in power.35 Moreover, she argues that this period reflects
the domestic factor (decline in the willingness to intervene) more than the systemic factor
(“significant change in the distribution of military or economic power”).36

As for the decline in the American role in international organizations, she is of the view that
the U.S. remains powerful in all “strategic” organizations” (those more meaningful to it in
certain issue areas when compared to bilateral negations), only withdrawing control over

32

Ibid.
Ibid.
34
Strange 1982, 479.
35
Strange 1982, 483-4.
36
Ibid.
33
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“symbolic” organizations of no strategic weight such as the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).37

Strange‟s criticism, in addition to various revisions and reservations, completely dispels the
myth of hegemonic stability: the association of periods international economic stability and
free trade with periods of hegemonic power. Empirically, the relation is weak and does not
apply universally to all issue areas or regions. Theoretically, the degree of causality is even
weaker. Yet, most importantly, there seems to be a devious connection between the
hegemonic stability theory and American isolationist foreign policy, which casts doubt on
whether this theory neutrally explains periods of isolation, or in truth, justifies them as they
are instigated. Consequently, this must also cast doubt on whether American hegemonic
decline, an inherent component of this discourse, can be seen in a similar light. In other
words, the possibility that anxiety over hegemonic decline is a pretext for expansionist or
aggressive American foreign policy cannot be ignored.

37

Ibid.
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B. KENNEDY‟S THEORETICAL APPROACH AND ITS CRITICISMS

Another theoretical approach to the question of American hegemonic decline is that
of Paul Kennedy. Writing just a couple of years before the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Kennedy tackles American decline towards the end of his monumental work: “The Rise and
Fall of the Great Powers”. To begin with, he identifies two major challenges to the
“longevity” of any hegemonic power: (a) balancing between national security requirements
and the material means of sustaining them; and (b) protecting “the technological and
economic bases of its power from relative erosion in the face of the ever-shifting patterns of
global production”.38 Faced with those challenges, he explains, the United States, like
previous great powers, therefore suffers from “imperial overstretch”, as its international
commitments are becoming exceedingly difficult to defend “simultaneously”.39

Kennedy also makes the important observation that the U.S. “has roughly the same massive
array of military obligations across the globe” as it had in the 1950s, “when its share of world
GNP, manufacturing production, military spending, and armed forces personnel were so
much larger”.40 This of course is a clear example of symptoms of relative decline in
American power. However, it should be noted that there could be a significant time lag
between changes in the various capabilities of major powers, and their subsequent translation
into changes in the international system, bearing in mind that such time lag is indeed one of
the most plausible explanations of how the United States was less-than-hegemonic during the

38

Kennedy 1987, 514-5.
Ibid.
40
Kennedy 1987, 521.
39
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Cold War when its economic and military capabilities suggested a more dominant role on the
international arena.

Moving on with his analysis, Kennedy identifies several specific challenges facing American
hegemony: “budgetary constraints” and planning for a “variety of military contingencies” in
the military realm, and relative industrial and agricultural decline, as well as running
“staggering deficits”, in the economic realm.41 Using his understanding of previous historical
cases of hegemonic decline, he thus foresees a U.S. suffering from having to meet “growing
foreign challenges” that drain valuable resources, channeling them away from “productive
investment”, and therefore ultimately resulting in “the downward spiral of slower growth,
heavier taxes, deepening domestic splits over spending priorities, and a weakening capacity
to bear the burdens of defense”.42

Finally, Kennedy argues that the extraordinarily huge American share of world wealth and
power, which reached forty percent by the end of the Second World War due to peculiar
“historical and technical circumstances” was, is, and must continue to be, in decline until it
reaches a more “natural” size of less than twenty percent, which would correspond to the
actual “geographic extent, population, and natural resources of the United States”.43
However, he asserts that the U.S. is still probably going to play an important role in the
multipolar world he expects to emerge in the future, simply because of its sheer size.44

41

Kennedy 1987, 522-6.
Kennedy 1987, 533-4.
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid.
42
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Commenting on Kennedy‟s work, George Modelski begins by challenging his criteria for
measuring hegemony that are solely based on notions of relative capabilities of power and
wealth. Modelski argues that other sources of hegemony outside of this realm, such as
identity, knowledge, and legitimacy (an important factor according to Kindleberger), cannot
be ignored. Of course this line of argument is very similar to the aforementioned “cultural
hegemony” concept introduced by Russet.45

Citing the previous example of British hegemony, Modelski argues that the same hegemonic
power can experience several phases of leadership, if the sources for its hegemony change.46
Therefore, he argues that even if relative decay of material capabilities occurs, decline does
not become inevitable because this can be remedied if other sources of leadership exist. With
this in mind, he claims that a world-wide process of democratization can provide and is
providing a new basis for an American hegemonic role. Contending that that such a process
of undeniable magnitude, embedded in a larger process of globalization of norms, is
currently reshaping international relations in a very significant way, he argues that the United
States is on its way to another period of hegemony because it is the most equipped power on
the global scene to manage such a sweeping change.47

He also considers some other factors that can possibly bring about such an extension of
American hegemony. For example, he asserts that in the absence of serious challengers in the
near future (whether a united Europe, Japan, or China), and with the possibility of major
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power war diminished as a result of the advent of nuclear power, alternative scenarios are
indeed limited.48

Therefore, Modelski, unlike Kennedy, believes that hegemonic decline is a remote
possibility, given that the process of democratization, amongst other factors, will provide the
United States with a new basis for a hegemonic role. Actually, this argument has been
presented by several other scholars, who do not necessarily have a similar perspective on the
matter, yet acknowledge the huge role a global democratization process can play in
reasserting American leadership.

One such scholar is William Robinson, who argues that as forces of globalization swept the
planet, American policy makers became increasingly aware of the drawbacks of tolerating,
accommodating, and in fact sometimes even promoting authoritarianism, which became an
inefficient mode of preserving global order. Accordingly, “polyarchy” (far from the true
nature of substantive democracy) became a more useful means to attain the same American
goals of simultaneously asserting hegemony and maintaining the world system of production
and distribution.49 For very different reasons, Robinson is, therefore, also of the belief that
„pseudo-democratization‟ (a change in cultural and ideological discourse) can propel
America into a new phase of hegemony.
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Writing in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War and the Second Gulf War, Lea
Brilmayer, also asserts the importance of democratization in providing a basis for American
hegemony. Holding the view that a moral justification for a hegemonic role is necessary, she
claims that the establishment of a “new world order” on the premise of globalizing
democracy provides a much-needed justification for a sustained American role on the global
arena.50

As such, several scholars (whether long-cycle theorists, neo-dependency theorists, or
liberals) share the view that some form of democratization can serve as an important source
of continued American hegemony. Such a view can challenge Kennedy‟s conclusion, if
hegemony is not merely defined as relative capabilities, and other factors contributing to
cultural hegemony, such as ideology, identity, and legitimacy, are considered.
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C. WALLERSTEIN AND THE WORLD SYSTEMS APPROACH

Employing a world systems approach, Terence Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein
reach the same widely held conclusion, of American hegemonic decline. They begin their
analysis by asserting two important points: (a) that hegemony is a brief phase in the life of
the interstate system, and (b) that the U.S enjoyed such a position of power in a “worldeconomy” and not a “world-empire”, starting from 1945.51 Then, they argue that this
American hegemony in the “world-system” began to decline during the period of 1967-73,
marking a movement into a new area of a long hegemonic cycle that started from 1873,
parallel to a transition from an “expansion A-phase” to a “contraction B-phase” in a shorter
Kondratieff cycle pronounced through the deceleration in the pace of “global economic
expansion”.52 Therefore, they conclude that this period was the climax of those two
intersecting “cyclical curves”, while contending that it might also be the pinnacle of another
longer curve: the life of the “modern world-system”.53

Whether or not this particular pattern of movement along those three cyclical curves actually
took place is not our primary concern, yet the arguments Hopkins and Wallerstein use to
prove and/or explain American hegemonic decline are extremely useful, especially as
Kennedy focuses on a universal explanation of the phenomenon of hegemonic decline and
understands the decline in American hegemony within the context of his framework for “The
Rise and Fall of the Great Powers”. And, also because although universal explanations, such
as Kennedy‟s, are sometimes useful, they cannot fully account for how certain phenomena
51

Hopkins and Wallerstein 1996, 3.
Hopkins and Wallerstein 1996, 9.
53
Ibid.
52

21

occur in certain ways at certain times (in other words, universality sometimes limits the
capacity for appreciating or even understanding the particular).

Wallerstein maintains that U.S. hegemony grew steadily for about a quarter of a century after
the Second World War, insisting that the “noisy in rhetoric” Cold War was a deviation from
a realization of the fact the Soviet Union “did not have anything near the productive strength
of the USA”.54 He explains how U.S. hegemony was challenged by the events of the 1967-73
period, first through the “growth in strength of other states in the core zone” such as
Germany and Japan, and then through the weakening of American “financial leverage” with
the surfacing of “EuroDollars” (Dollars outside direct American financial control due to their
location in Europe) and the contraction of U.S. gold reserves leading to the ending of the
“gold standard”.55

One of the focal points of this theoretical approach is the so-called world economic crisis of
the early 1970s. This generally refers to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, whereby
the American role was basically one of providing the world with a „central bank‟, by printing
Dollars as a source of international liquidity and tying up gold reserves to ensure Dollar
convertibility to gold (the so-called gold standard). This meant running balance-of-payments
deficits and depleting gold reserves, something the United States could not of course tolerate
indefinitely. In addition, as foreign Dollar reserves exceeded American reserves, and the
phenomenon of EuroDollars (Dollars in European banks) emerged, it became clear that
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American financial power decreased. Therefore, in 1971, the U.S. suspended the gold
standard and the world economy shifted from fixed to floating exchange rates.

While, this is a clear sign of some decline in American financial clout, nevertheless its
significance is somewhat exaggerated. Indeed, the whole issue is seriously blown out of
proportion when it is claimed that it marks the beginning of the decline phase in American
hegemony. This is particularly the case, given the fact that some scholars interpret those
events, as the outcomes of a conscious grand American strategy to reaffirm its global
leadership, albeit on different grounds.

Some scholars are of the view, that the U.S., increasingly aware of the limitations of its
economic leverage, set out to establish a new basis for a less visible (compared to the two
decades after the Second World War) yet equally meaningful hegemony or, according to
them, a new world order.56 They argue that the abolition of the gold standard, the devaluation
of the Dollar, the rise in oil prices, and the global inflation that ensued, were all components
of a deliberate American policy instigated to forward America‟s interests vis-à-vis its main
competitors, and breakaway from the unnecessary international commitments slowing down
its economic growth.57 Those scholars claim, for instance, that inflation was less pronounced
in the U.S. than in Western Europe and Japan, where energy dependency exposed the
economic vulnerability of those economies compared to the more self-sufficient American
economy. Additionally, they maintain that inflation had a positive effect on the
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competitiveness of American firms, producing a favorable outcome on the balance of trade
and the balance of payments.58

Of course such an understanding is also as potentially simplistic as the hegemonic decline
interpretations, and ignores that several events during this period were truly outside of
American control. However, even if there was no deliberate American strategy involved, it is
safe to conclude that the U.S. was not forced into relinquishing its extremely dominant role,
as much as this was a voluntary choice. Moreover, it is equally plausible that the outcome of
this period was a different form of American hegemony, and not a significant hegemonic
decline.
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D. AN ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL APPROACH

Each of the theoretical approaches examined in the preceding sections suffers from a
major flaw: hegemonic stability theory‟s central premise of associating of periods stability
and trade liberalization in the global economy with periods of hegemonic power does not
hold against rigorous empirical and theoretical analysis, Kennedy‟s approach ignores aspects
of hegemony such as legitimacy that transcend assessments of relative capabilities, and the
world systems approach significantly exaggerates the economic shocks of the 1970s to reach
very far reaching conclusions about the history, present and future of international relations
and the global economy.

1. Power vs. Power Resources

A theoretical approach or framework that adequately addresses the complex nature of
power and hegemony in the international system and global economy must avoid the attempt
to come up with a grand theory that explains general patterns of history, as is the case with
the abovementioned approaches, and begin with the more modest goal of formulating a clear
understanding of what constitutes power in the international relations context, as there are
many ways of defining and describing power in international relations.

25

According to John Mearsheimer, realists are of the view that state behavior is largely dictated
by the material aspects of international affairs.59 This orthodox view of the realist perspective
on power is somewhat simplistic.60 As a matter of fact, realists have a wider interpretation of
power that does not limit power to the material realm. For example, Hans Morgenthau argues
that: “power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the power of man over
man ... from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind
controls another”.61 For Morgenthau, non-material aspects of power such as “a nation‟s
character, morale and quality of governance” are very important.62 This is very evident in
Morgenthau‟s following remark: “power …. tends to be equated with material strength,
especially of a military nature, I have stressed more than before its immaterial aspects”.63

Neo-realists, such as Kenneth Waltz, have a narrower conception of power.64 Waltz identifies
the following components of power: “size of population and territory, resource endowment,
economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence”.65 Even though
Waltz does not ignore some non-material aspects such as political stability and competence,
he obviously puts a lot more emphasis on the material aspects of power.66 The reason for the
emphasis by neo-realists, such as Waltz, on material aspects of power is an outcome of their
commitment to the so-called „scientific‟ realism, which limits them mainly to tangible
elements that are easier to quantify.67 Therefore, although neo-realist tried to be more
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„scientific‟ than classical realists or modern realists such as Morgenthau, it is the latter that
had a wider and clearer understanding of power in the international relations context.

On the other hand, British historian, Niall Ferguson, who is a neo-conservative, argues that
power consists of (a) “… monopolizing as far as possible the means of projection (of power),
which mainly include material things: guns, butter, people, money, oil”, or what one can call
material sources of power; and (b) legitimacy and credibility, or what he calls “morale”. 68
Ferguson explains that the material sources of power are becoming more and more dispersed,
to the extent that real power depends on legitimacy and credibility.69 In other words,
Ferguson, much like the realists, identifies material and immaterial sources of power, and
puts equal (if not more) emphasis on immaterial sources.

However, perhaps the most accurate definition of power comes from the neo-liberal, Joseph
Nye. According to him, power, simply put, is the ability to produce certain outcomes.70 Nye
recognizes that power, defined as the ability to produce certain outcomes, is often associated
with certain resources that magnify this ability such as population, territory, natural
resources, economic strength, military force … etc., and one can also add credibility and
legitimacy to this list.71

He also adds that power is often inaccurately defined as the possession of those resources,
even though those resources do not guarantee the achievement of desired outcomes in and of
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themselves.72 Putting it rather brilliantly, he identifies those resources as the “high cards” is
the “international game of poker”, and rightly argues that holding those high cards does not
guarantee winning, if the “hand” is played poorly or if the player were to fall victim to
“bluff”.73

This distinction between power and the sources of power is also recognized by Susan Strange
and Bruce Russet.74 Strange also notes that power, defined as the ability to control outcomes,
cannot be measured empirically, while power, defined as the possession of the resources
reinforcing this ability, can be measured through quantitative indicators. 75 This explains why
mistaking power for the sources of power is so commonplace in the international relations
and political economy literature.

With the above clear understanding of power and the distinction between power resources
and power itself, the declinist argument that the decline in America‟s relative share of the
global economy automatically means a decline in American power is potentially simplistic.
For example, Paul Kennedy argues, in a very famous and controversial passage, that “… the
geographical extent, population, and natural resources of the United States suggest that it
ought to possess perhaps 16 or 18 percent of the world‟s wealth and power”, as opposed to
the 45 percent or more it possessed by the end of the Second World War, and that we are
currently witnessing the decline of this “extraordinary” share to a more “natural” share.76
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This argument has been the subject of huge controversy, as many scholars have sought to
explain the relative decline in America‟s share of the global economy from its 1950s level,
by (a) sighting the so-called “Second World War effect” (unlike all the great powers, the
United States was actually strengthened rather than weakened by the war), and (b) arguing
that this phenomenon is better explained by the expansion of Japan and Western Europe to
their “natural” size (the desirable result of a deliberate policy implemented by the United
States to check Soviet influence during the Cold War) rather than the shrinkage of America
to its “natural” size.77 Kennedy has actually rebutted this “Second World War effect”
argument, claiming that evidence suggests that America‟s share of the global economy is
declining to a level lower than its share in the late 1920s i.e. even prior to the Second World
War.78

This controversy is rather unconstructive because (a) the phrase “share of the world‟s
wealth”, or share of global power resources to be more accurate, is unquantifiable i.e. there is
no consensus on what indicators accurately measure this share, and (b) Kennedy is confusing
the sources of power (“wealth” to quote him) and power itself, as he is consistently lumping
“wealth” and “power” together. It is this confusion that leads Kennedy to make an even more
controversial argument in claiming that “… even when it declines to occupy its “natural”
share of the world‟s wealth and power, a long time into the future, the United States will still
be a very significant Power in a multipolar world, simply because of its size”.79
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The above argument demonstrates Kennedy‟s definition of power, as the possession of power
resources. He assumes that when America‟s share in of the world‟s wealth (power resources)
falls to 16 or 18 percent, this would automatically mean that the international system would
become multipolar. First of all, the argument that the United States would ultimately shrink
to this size is debatable. Far more importantly, the conclusion that this size will result in the
United States being a great power among others is groundless. This need not be the case at
all. America may still have hegemonic power, in the sense of possessing the ability to
produce favorable outcomes in the international system, even if its power resources relatively
shrink.

To use Nye‟s example, if this shrinkage in America‟s resource base actually occurs, America
may (a) still be holding “higher cards” than everyone else in the “international game of
poker”, and (b) it may be playing better than everyone else even if its cards are not as high as
they used to be. Therefore, if a distinction is made between the sources power and power
itself, the real question becomes whether or not America has maintained its power, in spite of
the relative decline in its power resources.

2. Relational Power vs. Structural Power

Power is best defined as the ability to produce desirable outcomes or to control
outcomes. As such, power could mean the ability of a certain actor to get another actor to do
something it would otherwise not do.80 Strange refers to this form of power as “relational
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power” i.e. the power one actor possesses in relation to another actor. 81 Strange argues that
this form of power is losing its significance in international relations, as states are no longer
competing for territory as much as they are competing for market shares.82 Of course this is
not to say that force and military security are insignificant; however, the way in which they
manifest themselves as sources of power has drastically shifted. Strange contrasts relational
power with what she believes is the form of power relevant in today‟s world, namely,
“structural power”. According to her, structural power is the ability to shape the structure of
the global economy and international system and to set the global agenda.83 To use Nye‟s
“international poker game” example, structural power would be the ability to dictate the rules
of the game itself.

Strange argues that structural power emanates from four sources, namely, (a) the ability to
control the security of other actors, (b) the ability to control the system of production, (c) the
ability to determine the structure of finance and credit, and (d) the ability to exert the most
influence over knowledge.84 She claims that the United States still possesses a great deal of
structural power understood as such.

To begin with, America still dominates the NATO alliance, and it is particularly this
asymmetry in the distribution of the security burden in the Western world that enables the
United States to dictate the rules of the game vis-à-vis Europe.85 The same can also be said
about America‟s role in guaranteeing the security of Japan. It is important to note that
81
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Strange was making the above arguments before the end of the Cold War. The
preponderance of American military power relative to all other significant economic powers,
nevertheless, still remains quite undeniable nowadays.

However, the crucial factor here is not American military power in its absolute sense, but
rather whether this power is utilized to guarantee the security of the world‟s significant
economic powers, giving the United States the kind of influence and leverage it had in the
Cold War era. In this regard, an important question is how the replacement of the risk of
Soviet dominance by other security challenges has affected America‟s structural power with
respect to the security aspect.

With regards to the ability to control the system of production, Strange rightfully argues, that
in a globalized world dominated by „MNCs‟, it not America‟s share of production that
matters but rather the share of American-based corporations.86 Writing in 1987, Strange
observed that any list of the largest corporations in the world would be dominated by
American-based corporations.87 This observation is still mostly true nowadays in spite of the
recent troubles in the American economy, as validated empirically.

It is with respect to the ability to shape the structure of finance and credit that Strange make
her finest argument. She concludes, and rightly so, that the predominance of the U.S. Dollar
has enabled America to run staggering deficits and remain largely unaffected. As such, those
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deficits are a sign of America‟s dominance and not its weakness.88 The American dominance
of financial markets, she argues, is evidenced by the domination of American banks and
financial institutions, which hold a huge share of the world‟s bank assets.89

Those arguments remain valid today, and the impact the meltdown in the American financial
markets has had on the global economy suggests that America still dominates international
financial markets. In any case, America‟s power in the financial markets should be examined
in light of recent events to ascertain whether Strange‟s arguments in this regard are still valid.

Finally, Strange argues that America is still able to exert the most influence over knowledge.
Writing back in the late 1980s, she referred to America‟s domination of the fields of
information technology and telecommunications90, which as the 1990s unfolded proved to be
a remarkably accurate observation, as it was particularly those fields that propelled the
American economy to staggering growth in the age of the Internet. Nowadays, evidence is
aplenty of the remarkable influence America has on knowledge. American universities are
still the highest rated in the world and the United States continues to dominate the Noble
Prize, especially in natural sciences.

3. Soft Power and Legitimacy

Scholars from different backgrounds identify legitimacy as a crucial component of
power and hegemony. Applying a neo-liberal approach to the matter, Joseph Nye coined the
88
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term „soft power‟. He argues that power, defined as the ability to produce outcomes, can be
achieved through coercion whether by “force or inducement” (i.e. “sticks” or “carrots”), or
through “attraction” (or the “ability to shape what others want”).91 He labels power achieved
through coercion “hard power”, as opposed to power achieved through attraction which he
labels “soft power”.

With respect to soft power, Nye warns against the confusion of sources of soft power such as
an attractive culture or attractive political values (e.g. democracy and human rights), and soft
power itself, which simply put is the possession of legitimacy and credibility. 92 An important
example Nye makes of the significance of soft power is his brilliant analysis of the so-called
„War on Terrorism‟, the outcome of which he believes depends largely on the ability of the
United States to attract moderate Muslims.93 In this particular case, the sources of America‟s
soft power are perhaps not be found in its culture, but rather in the perceived legitimacy of its
actions and policies, and it is particularly here where the Bush Administration has failed most
miserably, especially by launching the Iraq invasion in 2003.

Another approach to the factor of legitimacy and credibility with respect to power is the
Gramscian approach. The starting point of this approach is recognizing the importance of
nonmaterial normative bases of power, or in other words, acknowledging the fact that
hegemony is usually based on „legitimate domination‟.94 Combining the arguments of Max
Weber and legal positivists, in an international context, yields two conclusions: (a) that there
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is a need to justify power through legitimacy; and (b) that legitimacy is usually conferred
through upheld values and norms (dependant on cognitive factors).95

This leads to the conclusion that consolidation of hegemonic power emanates from adherence
to the normative framework or value structure forwarded by the hegemon.96 In this respect,
Antonio Gramsci, stresses the importance of ideological control and consensus building in
legitimizing domination through establishing desirable frames of reference.97

According to him, there are three main types of hegemony: (a) integral hegemony where the
hegemon is able to simultaneously satisfy its interest and the aspirations of the entire system;
(b) declining hegemony where “acute contradictions” exist between the hegemon‟s interests
and those of its subordinates; and (c) minimal hegemony where contradictions exist, yet
subordinates are too weak to pose a challenge, and a high degree of consensus is still possible
without coercion, particularly through “legitimate domination”.98 Along those lines, Alan
Carfuny argues that Keynesianism provided the basis for American integral hegemony in the
two decades following the Second World War, and that the global acceptance of the
„Neoliberal Discourse‟ starting as of the 1990s allows America some measure of minimal
hegemony. Therefore, the Gramscian approach suggests that the United States could still be
able to preserve a minimal form of hegemony, through the legitimate domination of weak
subordinates, owing to their acceptance of its normative values.99
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Although the terms „soft power‟ and „legitimate domination‟, on the surface of things have
very different connotations, both terms shed light on the importance of the factor of
legitimacy in solidifying or eroding power. The question of whether or not America‟s
legitimacy and credibility as hegemon is on the decline is therefore of crucial importance.

Hence, perhaps the best approach to the question of examining America‟s power in
international relations and the global economy is to assess the degree of structural power the
U.S. enjoys coupled with an analysis of the factor of legitimacy and how it can cement or
deplete such structural power to achieve American hegemony. This would be in line with
Robert Cox‟s understanding of hegemony, in the international relations context, as a
combination of material power, a normative image of world order and international
institutions that appear to realize that order in a universal manner.100 In other words, Susan
Strange‟s structural power approach can be used to have a better understanding of America‟s
position in terms of material power in today‟s world; however, assessing how this material
power, whatever its degree, can be translated into hegemony (as understood by Cox) would
ultimately rest on how the U.S. can couple its raw material power with norms and institutions
in order to achieve legitimate domination on the international arena.
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III.

AMERICA’S STRUCTURAL POWER

A. AMERICAN SECURITY PROMINENCE

According to Susan Strange, the first, and perhaps the foremost, source of structural
power is the ability of the hegemon to control or effect the security of other actors. There are
several means of empirically verifying America's prominence in the security realm especially
vis-à-vis its allies, but perhaps the most telling measures of this prominence are (a) the sheer
size of American military spending, and (b) the U.S. possession of superior military
capabilities, especially compared to American allies (most notably, the advanced economies
of Western Europe and the Far East, and the oil-rich Gulf states).

With regards to military spending, the next table and figure illustrate the size of the military
expenditure for the twenty highest military spending countries of the world.

Table 1: Size of Military Expenditure in 2009
Country

Military Expenditure (US$ million at 2008 prices and
exchange rates)

United States
China
United Kingdom
France
Russia
Germany
Japan
Saudi Arabia
Italy
India
South Korea

663,255
98,800
69,271
67,316
61,000
48,022
46,859
39,257
37,427
36,600
27,130
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Brazil
27,124
Canada
20,564
Australia
20,109
Spain
19,409
Turkey
19,009
Israel
14,309
Greece
13,917
Netherlands
12,642
Poland
10,860
Source:
Stockholm
International
Peace
Research
Institute
http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+milex+data+1988-2009.xls
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As demonstrated above, as late as 2009, the United States was by far the largest military
spender in the world, with a military expenditure that is almost an order of magnitude larger
than that of China, its closest rival. Of particular significance is the fact that America has a
military expenditure that is about ten times or higher that of its top military spending allies,
such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Italy and South Korea.
This points out to the hegemonic nature of America‟s security relations with its allies, which
seem to rely, at least in their military spending patterns, on America‟s providence of their
security, whether in whole or in part.
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The next table and figure illustrate the same pattern based on the data for the year 2000,
revealing, that in terms of military spending, American dominance in the field of security has
far from declined, and that it might have even increased over time, at least in recent years.

Table 2: Size of Military Expenditure in 2000
Country

Military Expenditure (US$ million at 2008 prices and
exchange rates)

United States

377,228

France

62,707

United Kingdom

54,055

Germany

51,487

Japan

47,496

Italy

43,150

China

31,200

Russia

29,700

Saudi Arabia

23,523

India

21,874

Turkey

21,758

Brazil

19,550

South Korea

18,306

Spain

14,443

Canada

13,823

Australia

13,389

Israel

12,856

Greece

11,335

Netherlands

11,311

United Arab
10,940
Emirates
Source:
Stockholm
International
Peace
Research
Institute
http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+milex+data+1988-2009.xls
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As a matter of fact, comparison of the 2000 and 2009 military spending figures points out to
two key trends: (a) the increase in military expenditure by the United States and the widening
of the military spending gap between the U.S. and its highest military spending allies, and (b)
the significant increase in the military spending of China (although China is still far from
catching-up with America in terms of military expenditure).

The next figure demonstrates the first trend graphically pointing out to the widening of the
gap in military spending between the United States and its allies with the highest expenditure
on military, perhaps highlighting their even recently increased reliance on America in the
security realm.
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Figure 3: Comparison of Military Spending of American Allies (2000 & 2009)
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This trend cannot be entirely explained by the decline in the military spending levels of
America‟s allies, as some of those allies actually increased their military spending in 2009
from its 2000 levels (fixing the prices and exchange rates at their 2008 levels), at least in
absolute figures. The widening of the military spending gap between the United States and its
allies is actually better explained by the steep rise in American military spending from 2000
to 2009, which increased by seventy five percent (while accounting for inflation and
exchange rate fluctuation). More importantly, as demonstrated in the next figures, not only
did American military spending increase in absolute terms; it actually increased, as a share of
the global military expenditure, from 36% to 43%. Those figures are based on the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) methodology used to determine military
expenditure by country for each of the two reference years. While data is unavailable for
some countries, suggesting that global military expenditure is actually higher than the result
of aggregating the SIPRI data for each country, this has little, if any, analytical effect on
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observing the trend in America‟s relative share of global military expenditure, as by and
large the same countries have missing data in both years.
Figure 4: America’s Share of Global Military Expenditure (2000)
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Figure 5: America’s Share of Global Military Expenditure (2009)
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The data on military expenditure does indeed point out to an American predominance in the
security and military realm as a global hegemonic superpower, and more specifically to
American dominance vis-à-vis U.S. allies (whether in Western Europe, the Asia-Pacific or
the Middle East), and in fact suggests that this dominance is perhaps increasing rather than
101

The United States would have a lower share if data is available for all counties of the world, and as such the
U.S. does certainly have a lower share, the size of which cannot unfortunately be determined accurately.
102
Same as the pervious note.
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decreasing with the passage of time. However, military expenditure does not alone confirm a
dominant hegemonic military position for the United States, or more specifically a significant
role for the U.S. in guaranteeing or effecting the security of its most important allies (which
is the key element in determining whether America scores high on this first source of
structural power).

Therefore, it is also important to examine American military capabilities, especially with
regards to the possession of advanced and strategic weaponry. In this regard, it is still quite
prudent to analyze the data available on nuclear warheads and their delivery systems. With
respect to nuclear warheads, the below table summarizes the estimated number of warheads
possessed, as of January 2010, by each of the declared states in possession of nuclear arms,
whether or not they are signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

Table 3: Nuclear Warhead Estimates by Country
Country

Deployed warheads Other warheads

Total

United States

2,468

7,100

9,600

Russia

4,630

7,300

12,000

UK

160

65

225

France

300

..

300

China

..

200-240

200-240

India

..

60–80

60–80

Pakistan

..

70–90

70–90

Israel

..

80

80

Source:
Stockholm
International
http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2010/08

Peace

Research
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Institute

(SIPRI)

available

on

The foregoing data clearly points out to the unique positions of the United States and Russia,
as the possessors of the largest number of nuclear warheads. However, more importantly, this
data confirms that most of the U.S. allies, if not all of them, rely on American nuclear
capabilities (without U.S. nuclear weapons, America‟s European allies, even the United
Kingdom and France, would be exposed to a clear disparity in nuclear capability vis-à-vis
Russia, and the same applies to its Asia-Pacific allies with respect to disparity with Russia
and China, and potentially North Korea). As for delivery systems, it should be noted that the
United States and Russia also have far more advanced capabilities, with each possessing
multiple long-range ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile), SLBM (submarine launched
ballistic missiles) and strategic bomber capabilities. The United Kingdom and France, being
the American allies in possession of nuclear weapons, are far more limited in their delivery
system capabilities compared to the United States or Russia.103 Therefore, America‟s allies in
Europe, even the United Kingdom and France, still to date rely on American nuclear
capabilities for their security, even if partially.

Furthermore, in addition to America‟s providence of nuclear deterrent security to its allies,
the United States also provides traditional security to many of its key allies, most notably,
Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the oil-rich Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and
Kuwait. This is a very crucial factor, as in the post-Cold War era, security is not limited to
nuclear deterrence, with the emergence of other types of threats to security such as the
horizontal proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and global terrorism, and the
diminishing of the threat of a nuclear confrontation between the East and the West. The
presence of American troops in, or close to, the territories of those allies, which are either
103

Search „nuclear forces‟ for each relevant country on http://first.sipri.org/
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industrialized economic powers or resource-rich economies, guarantees the U.S. a significant
measure of structural power in relation to those states, especially those almost entirely reliant
on American military presence both for national security and regime stability, which is very
evident in the case of the oil-rich Gulf states. This not only helps America exert a lot of
influence over those states in particular; it also cements the hegemonic status of the United
States in international relations and the global economy in general. The below table lists the
number of American troops on foreign soil or afloat overseas, clearly demonstrating a
significant American presence in the Gulf region especially in and around Iraq, in the AsiaPacific region especially in Japan and South Korea, and in Western Europe especially in
Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.

Table 4: U.S. Foreign Troop Deployments (as of 30 September 2010)104
Region/Country
Europe

Number

Region/Country
Sub-Saharan Africa

Number

Region/Country
East Asia & Pacific

Number

Albania

8

Angola

7

Australia

130

Austria
Belgium
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic

22
1,252
8
15
13
16
7

Botswana
Burundi
Cameroon
Chad
Congo (Brazzaville)
Congo (Kinshasa)
Cote D'Ivoire

9
6
9
10
1
9
8

Burma
Cambodia
China & Hong Kong
Indonesia & Timor
Japan
N. Korea
S. Korea105

Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France

12
6
16
64

Djibouti
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon

1,379
1
9
1

Germany
Greece
Greenland
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macedonia

53,951
338
133
54
8
9,646
7
7
7
16

Ghana
Guinea
Kenya
Liberia
Mali
Mauritania
Mozambique
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda

Malta

6

Senegal

104
105

Number

12
11
56
26
34,385
2
27,014

Region/Country
North Africa, Near East & South
Asia
Afghanistan (see Operation
Enduring Freedom)
Algeria
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Diego Garcia
Egypt
India
Iraq (see Operation New Dawn)

Laos
Malaysia
Marshall Islands
Mongolia

6
13
16
5

Israel
Jordan
Kuwait (see Operation New Dawn)
Lebanon

35
30
0
5

11
8
35
36
6
8
6
6
22
5

New Zealand
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam
Afloat

7
207
132
110
16
8,819

Total
Western Hemisphere
Antigua
Argentina

43,953
2
23

Morocco
Nepal
Oman
Pakistan
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Sri Lanka
Syria
Tunisia
United Arab Emirates

12
9
30
133
555
239
10
9
12
94

9

Bahamas, The
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Yemen

15

0
10
1,349
8
238
275
26
0

U.S. Department of Defense available on http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/hst1009.pdf
As of 30 September 2007: available on http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/hst0709.pdf
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Netherlands
Norway

442
71

Sierra Leone
Somalia

2
19

Barbados
Belize

9
2

Afloat
Operation New Dawn

4,717
96,200

Poland

34

South Africa

39

Bermuda

3

Operation Enduring Freedom

105,900

Portugal
Romania

703
16

St. Helena
Sudan

3
3

Bolivia
Brazil

14
39

Total

209,911

Slovakia
Slovenia

10
7

Tanzania
Togo

12
5

Canada
Chile

127
31

Spain
Sweden

1,240
11

Uganda
Zambia

9
7

Colombia
Costa Rica

62
8

Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom

21
1,530
9,229

Zimbabwe

9

Total

1,709

Cuba (Guantanamo)
Dominican Republic
Ecuador

913
13
20

Afloat

362

El Salvador

24

Total

79,288

Guatemala

12

Former Soviet Union
Armenia

9

Guyana
Haiti

2
15

Azerbaijan

8

Honduras

403

Georgia

24

Jamaica

9

Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Moldova
Russia
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan

15
11
5
47
6
4
11
5

Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago
Uruguay

28
17
19
11
42
1
8
17

Total

145

Venezuela
Afloat

17
8

Total

1,943

Therefore, there are several indicators that the United States possesses structural power in the
form of controlling the security of several key players in international relations and the global
economy. On the one hand, American military expenditure clearly surpasses that of any other
country, including all of its allies, and the gap in military spending between the United States
and the most economically sound of its allies has actually widened recently. On the other
hand, America‟s allies, whether in Europe or the Far East, rely on it for nuclear deterrence
security vis-à-vis Russia, China and potentially North Korea. And, last but by no means least,
American troops deployed on foreign soil and afloat overseas guarantee the security of
several key allies of the United States, especially the oil-rich Gulf states, which also rely on
American troops to guarantee regime stability. Therefore, for all of the forgoing reasons,
America still enjoys considerable structural power in the security realm, at least vis-à-vis its
allies in Western Europe, the Far East and the Gulf region.
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B. AMERICAN CONTROL OF THE GLOBAL SYSTEM OF PRODUCTION

Another measure of structural power according to Susan Strange is the ability to
control the system of production. According to her, measuring the degree of American
control over the global system of production is best determined not on the basis of America‟s
purely numerical share of global output, but rather on the degree of prominence of Americanbased corporations in the international economy.

The relative decline in America‟s share in global production, which is taking place nowadays
mainly due to the rapid development of emerging markets can be rather deceiving, if it is, in
truth, driven by American-based corporations (among other Western-based corporations)
increasingly moving their operations overseas, because even though such a trend would
translate into a relatively lower share for the American economy in global production, it does
not mean that the control or influence of the American economy over the structure of global
production has decreased.

As a matter of fact, in today‟s globalized world, many Western (and especially American)
corporations are moving some of their activities to the developing world countries in search
for cheap labor and other factors of production. However, although this translates into higher
standards of living and higher GDPs for the developing countries, to take this as a sign of the
economic empowerment of developing countries vis-à-vis the Western economic powers,
especially the United States, would be rather naïve, as it would be ignoring the simple
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realities of structural power, which basically boils down in this realm to who controls who
produces what, where and for what price.

In order to test this aspect of structural power empirically, an important starting point is to
analyze the Fortune Global 500 list, which is an annual list of the world‟s largest
corporations based on turnover and revenues, compiled by the renowned Fortune Magazine.
The below table summarizes the breakdown of the Fortune Global 500 list for the year 2009
on the main economic centers of the world.

Table 5: Number of Fortune Global 500 Companies for 2009
Economic Center

Number of Fortune Global 500 Companies
for 2009

Australia

9

Brazil

6

Canada

14

China/Hong Kong

37

Eurozone

126

Great Britain

27

India

7

Japan

68

Mexico

4

Other Centers

13

Russia

8

South Korea

14

Sweden

6

Switzerland

15

Taiwan

6

United States

140

Source: Fortune Magazine available on http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2009/index.html
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The foregoing data confirms that the United States, closely followed by the Eurozone, is the
leading economic center in terms of the share of the largest companies in the world.
However, as demonstrated in the below figure, the Fortune Global 500 data seems to suggest
that there are two major economic centers in the world: the United States and the Eurozone.

Figure 6: Number of Fortune Global 500 Companies for 2009
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The same observation is also valid, if rather than focusing on the number of companies per
economic center, which can be misleading; the focus is on the total revenues of the Fortune
Global 500 companies belonging to each of the main economic centers of the world. The
next table and figure illustrate the consistency of the pattern of the United States leading with
the greatest share followed closely by the Eurozone.

Table 6: Total Fortune Global 500 Company Revenues (in US$ million) for 2009
Economic Center

Total Fortune Global 500 Company
Revenues (in US$ million) for 2009

Australia

300,231

Brazil

323,673

Canada

381,021
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China/Hong Kong

1,660,834

Eurozone

7,337,807

Great Britain

1,585,173

India

232,342

Japan

2,979,580

Mexico

196,263

Other Centers

694,407

Russia

402,506

South Korea

603,406

Sweden

173,918

Switzerland

565,503

Taiwan

195,075

United States

7,543,730

Source: Fortune Magazine available on http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2009/index.html

Figure 7: Total Fortune Global 500 Company Revenues (in US$ million) for 2009
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Analysis of the Fortune Global 500 companies for the year 2005 reveals a substantially
similar distribution of the world largest companies on the main economic centers, also with
the United States having the lead followed closely by the Eurozone, whether in terms of the
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number of companies or the breakdown by total revenues. The below figures illustrate the
findings based on the 2005 data set.

Figure 8: Number of Fortune Global 500 Companies for 2005
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Source: Fortune Magazine available on http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2005/index.html

Figure 9: Total Fortune Global 500 Company Revenues (in US$ million) for 2005
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Source: Fortune Magazine available on http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2005/index.html

51

Comparison of the Fortune Global 500 data sets for the years 2005 and 2009 reveals several
trends: (a) a decline in the shares of the United States, Great Britain and Japan, (b) a slight
increase in the share of the Eurozone, and (c) a significant increase in the share of emerging
market economies, especially China. The below figures illustrate the comparison of the two
data sets.
Figure 10: Comparison of Fortune Global 500 Data (2005 & 2009) by Number of
Companies
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Figure 11: Comparison of Fortune Global 500 Data (2005 & 2009) by Percentage of
Total Revenues
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2009

Therefore, analysis of the Fortune Global 500 data suggests that (a) the United States does
not have an absolute or unrivaled control over the global system of production, as the
strength of its corporations (although slightly stronger) is almost matched by those based in
the Eurozone, and (b) that the Eurozone and China (and other emerging markets) are steadily
catching-up with the United States.

However, analysis of the FT Global 500, which is an annual ranking of the world‟s largest
companies released by Financial Times, but based on market capitalization, reveals a
completely different pattern. The strength of American-based corporations, in terms of
market capitalization, is unrivaled and points out to a clear dominance by the United States.
The next figures demonstrate the unparalleled position of the United States both in terms of
number of companies and total market value in light of the FT Global 500 list for the year
2010.

Figure 12: Number of FT Global 500 Companies for 2010
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Source: Financial Times available on http://www.ft.com/reports/ft500-2010
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Figure 13: Total Market Value of FT Global 500 Companies for 2010 (in US$ million)
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The degree of dominance of American-based corporations is best illustrated by the below
figure, which demonstrates the relative sizes of the market values of the FT Global 500
companies belonging to each of the main economic centers of the world.

Figure 14: Distribution of Market Values of FT Global 500 Companies (v1)
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Figure 15: Distribution of Market Values of FT Global 500 Companies (v2)
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As demonstrated in the above figure, it is suffice to say that the relative market value of the
American-based corporations listed on the FT Global 500 list for 2010 is roughly equivalent
to the relative market value of all of the corporations belonging to the other main financial
centers combined (the Eurozone, Great Britain, Japan and China/Hong Kong), and
significantly more than the relative market value of the corporations of the rest of the world
combined (which includes the rest of Europe and the rest of the emerging markets, in
addition to Canada and Australia). Analysis of the FT Global 500 data set, therefore, clearly
demonstrates the dominance of American corporations in the international economy and
proves beyond doubt an unrivaled degree of dominance for the United States in shaping the
structure of international production.

The question is how this may be reconciled with the analysis of the Fortune Global 500 data
set, which although puts the United States on top, reveals rivalry from the Eurozone and
relative decline over time. The answer is simply that, because the Fortune Global 500 list is
based on company revenues, it does not reflect the true value of banks and financial services
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companies, and of computer technology and software companies, which may have much
higher value than their annual turnover suggests.

As a matter of fact, it is perhaps in those two sectors where American-based corporations are
truly dominant. More importantly, on the one hand, the banks and financial services sector
plays an important role in shaping the structure of international credit and not just the
structure of global production. On the other hand, the computer technology and software
sector is also shaping the future of the world from the social and cultural perspectives. For
example, companies such as Facebook, Apple, Twitter, Google and Microsoft, which are all
based in the United States, are producing products, gadgets, applications and programs that
are truly changing the means of social and cultural interaction between millions of people
worldwide. Their significance cannot, therefore, be captured by their turnovers or even their
market capitalizations, and their influence and importance cannot be compared to the
influence and importance of oil services or automobile manufacturing companies of similar
turnover or market capitalization. A case in point, in this regard, is how Facebook and
Twitter facilitated interaction among youths in Tunisia and Egypt, resulting in massive
demonstrations that have very recently resulted in regime change.

As such, the FT Global 500 data set is far more accurate in describing the world‟s most
valuable and influential corporations, and hence provides a more accurate measure of the
influence of American-based corporations on the structure of the global economy.
Accordingly, it is apparent that the United States still retains a significant degree of control
on the structure of global production, and that it clearly enjoys significant structural power in
this realm.
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C. AMERICAN CONTROL OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS

Susan Strange also argues that the dominance of the U.S. Dollar has enabled America
to run staggering deficits and remain largely unaffected, which demonstrates that those huge
deficits are a sign of the structural power of America and not of the relative weakness of the
American economy. The below table summarizes the breakdown of official foreign exchange
reserves in the world among the various international currencies during the period between
1995 and 2009.

Table 7: Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (in US$ million)
Year

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

U.S. Dollars

610337

760071

828887

888724

979783

1079916

1122431

1204673

Pounds Sterling

21874

32883

32856

34142

39827

41798

42401

50537

Deutsche Marks

163088

179916

184349

176951

0

0

0

0

French Francs

24361

22638

18314

20814

0

0

0

0

Japanese Yens

70071

82307

73487

80029

87939

92078

79190

78145

Swiss Francs

3464

3705

4435

4237

3172

4087

4372

7314

Netherlands Guilders

3306

2935

4461

3489

0

0

0

0

ECUs

88288

86837

77322

16637

0

0

0

0

Euros

0

0

0

0

246950

277693

301026

427327

Other Currencies

49387

53172

47871

57383

22034

22672

20069

27919

Allocated Reserves

1034175

1224464

1271982

1282406

1379705

1569488

1795915

Unallocated Reserves

355626

341805

344266

361397

402242

418039

480092

612063

Total Holdings

1389801

1616248

1643803

1781947

1936282

2049580

2407978

2007

2008

2009

Year

1566268

1518244

2003

2004

2005

2006

U.S. Dollars

1465752

1751012

1902535

2171075

Pounds Sterling

61655

89457

102243

145205

192663

168773

194183

Deutsche Marks

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

French Francs

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Japanese Yens

87608

101787

101769

102051

120480

131902

137680

57

2641645

2699122

2837844

2002

Swiss Francs

5016

4419

4143

5685

6395

5799

5318

Netherlands Guilders

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

ECUs

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Euros

559246

658531

683809

831947

1082276

1112223

1249954

Other Currencies

43833

49865

49041

59520

75731

92806

141774

Allocated Reserves

2223110

2655070

2843541

3315483

4119190

4210624

4566753

Unallocated Reserves

801961

1093288

1459417

1919612

2563271

3110934

3520052

Total Holdings

3025071

3748358

4302958

5235095

6682461

7321558

8086805

Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) available on http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/cofer/eng/index.htm

The below figure demonstrates the allocation of the official foreign reserves among the
different currencies expressed as percentages, which gives a clearer picture on the relative
weights of the reserves denominated in those currencies during the same period from 1995 to
2009.

Figure 16: Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (1995-2009)
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As demonstrated in the preceding figure, the U.S. Dollar has remained the most dominant
currency in which official foreign exchange reserves are held across the world throughout the
period examined spanning almost a decade and a half. Reserves denominated in Dollars have
constituted, on average, close to two-thirds of the overall foreign currency reserves during
said period. Although, as highlighted by the preceding data, the relative weight of the official
foreign reserves denominated in Euros has grown gradually during the past few years, the
effect this has had on the dominance of the U.S. Dollar has remained quite minimal, with the
Dollar still firmly ahead of the Euro, and with Dollar reserves still constituting more than
double the Euro reserves. The below figure illustrates the composition by currency of the
official foreign exchange reserves held by various countries in 2009, demonstrating the
continued dominance of the U.S. Dollar until very recently.

Figure 17: Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves in 2009

3.10%

U.S. Dollars
Pounds Sterling

27.37%

Japanese Yens
62.14%

Swiss Francs
Euros

Other Currencies

0.12%
3.01%
4.25%

59

The need for governments and central banks all over the world to hold significant U.S. Dollar
reserves actually reflects the dominance of the Dollar as the predominant currency of
international trade (i.e. governments and central banks all over the world need to hold Dollar
reserves in order to purchase Dollar denominated commodities, most importantly oil). A
telling measure of the prominent role of the U.S. Dollar in international trade is its large
relative share of the foreign exchange turnover, as demonstrated in the below table.

Table 8: Currency Distribution of Foreign Exchange Turnover at April 2007 Exchange
Rates (percentage share of average daily turnover)106
Year

2001

2004

2007

U.S. Dollar

76.16%

85.25%

86.35%

Euro

48.06%

40.00%

36.98%

Japanese Yen

19.89%

17.56%

16.54%

Pound Sterling

15.47%

17.88%

14.95%

Swiss Franc

7.22%

6.19%

6.78%

Australian Dollar

5.90%

6.33%

6.66%

Canadian Dollar

5.16%

4.73%

4.21%

Swedish Krona

2.59%

2.43%

2.78%

Hong Kong Dollar

1.88%

1.78%

2.78%

Other Currencies

17.67%

17.85%

21.97%

As illustrated graphically in the next figure, the dominance of the U.S. Dollar in foreign trade
transactions remained very evident as late as 2007.

106

The total is 200% because each foreign exchange transaction involves two currencies. Figures include spot,
outright forward and foreign exchange swap transactions. Source: Bank of International Settlements available
on http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfxf07t.pdf
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Figure 18: Currency Distribution of Foreign Exchange Turnover (as at 2007)
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The need to accumulate reserves in Dollars not only arises due to the requirements of
purchasing essential commodities denominated in U.S. Dollars; it is also magnified due to
the requirements of servicing Dollar denominated debts. A case in point in this regard is the
huge portion of the U.S. Dollar cross-border liabilities of banks denominated in foreign
currencies, as demonstrated in the below table.

Table 9: Foreign Currency Denominated Cross-border Liabilities of Banks (total
amount outstanding as of reference period in US$ billion)
Period

Dec-07

Dec-08

Dec-09

U.S. Dollar

10,021.50

9,261.00

9,073.00

Euro

3,475.00

3,262.20

3,158.20

Yen

824.20

825.80

578.50

1,326.10

1,006.50

857.00

395.20

405.60

371.00

Other

1,485.40

1,281.60

1,363.70

Total Allocated

17,527.40

16,042.70

15,401.40

Pound Sterling
Swiss Franc

Source: Bank of International Settlements available on http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qa1006.pdf
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The below figure illustrates the clear significance of U.S. Dollar denominated debt in light of
the preceding data.

Figure 19: Foreign Currency Denominated Cross-border Liabilities of Banks
(percentage as of reference period)
60%
50%
40%
Dec-07

30%

Dec-08
20%

Dec-09

10%
0%
U.S. Dollar

Euro

Yen

Pound
Sterling

Swiss Franc

Other

As illustrated in the figure below, as late as December 2009, U.S. Dollar denominated bank
debt was almost of 60% of the total foreign currency denominated cross-border bank debt.

Figure 20: Foreign Currency Denominated Cross-border Liabilities of Banks
(breakdown by currency as of December 2009)
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Therefore, based on the preceding data, it is clear that Strange‟s arguments with respect to
the dominance of the U.S. Dollar remain valid today. The U.S. Dollar is still, by and large,
the world‟s leading reserve currency. It has occupied this position because it clearly remains
the world‟s leading vehicle and invoicing currency, with many international trade
transactions not necessarily involving an American counterparty being consummated in U.S.
Dollars. This is particularly significant, as the trade of many of the most important
commodities (especially oil) is still conducted in U.S. Dollars, although there are recent signs
that major oil producers such as Russia and Iran are seeking to reverse this trend. Of equal
importance is the fact that the U.S. Dollar is the most prominent currency in the international
debt markets. To put it simply, governments and central banks are making sure national
savings are held in Dollars to be able to service national debt denominated in Dollars and
also to purchase important and strategic commodities that are sold on the international
markets mainly in Dollars.

A few decades ago, several scholars argued that the abolition of the gold standard, the
devaluation of the Dollar, and the rise in oil prices, which was followed by global inflation,
all worked in America‟s favor, or maybe even were deliberately orchestrated by the United
States. It is rather doubtful that the United States was fully aware of the positive implications
the abolition of the gold standard, and the events that followed that economic earthquake,
will ultimately have on the American status in the global economy. However, it is very
evident that the main outcome of those events, being the concentration of America‟s
structural power as the hegemon with the extraordinary privilege of having its currency as the
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global reserve currency, has placed and continues to place America in a uniquely
advantageous position.

This position can be summarized as follows: (a) ever since the abolition of the gold standard
in 1971, the U.S. Dollar has been the global reserve currency that only the United States can
generate by fiat (i.e. by law or decree and without pegging to gold or any other currency or
valuable commodity); (b) as a result of this unique privilege, the United States is allowed to
simply produce Dollars, while the rest of the world, including all the other leading economic
powers, have to produce goods and services or dispose of their natural resources that can all
be sold for Dollars, which are then used to buy goods, services and natural resources also
denominated in Dollars from international markets, or to service Dollar denominated debts;
(c) consequently, major economic players, especially emerging market economies that face
speculative threats to their national currencies, hold most of their savings, and especially
their foreign currency reserves in Dollars; and (d) this continuous appetite for Dollars creates
a sizeable international demand for Dollars, which in turn reinforces the strength of the
Dollar, and hence ensures it remains the preferred global reserve currency. One of the
necessary preconditions for this American hegemonic privilege is that major commodities
(especially oil) continue to be bought and sold in Dollars, and that in particular explains the
continuous American strategic interest in the stability, and American dominance, of the
Middle East region, which accounts for the majority of global oil and gas reserves.
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A buy-product of this position is the staggering deficits run by the American economy, with
the American national debt standing in 2009 at around 11 trillion U.S. Dollars.107 However,
this apparent debt problem is not a sign of weakness but rather a demonstration of America‟s
structural power emanating from the position of the U.S. Dollar as the global reserve
currency. Because the other economic powers of the world have a continued demand for
more and more Dollars, they are continuously lending the United States, especially by
purchasing U.S. treasury bills. In other words, America is running huge deficits because the
rest of the world is financing the United States due to the need to hold U.S. Dollar reserves.
Simply put, this element of structural power is giving America a free ride in the world
economy, as it can go on printing Dollars and issuing t-bills, as long as other nations are
willing to buy those t-bills, thereby basically bankrolling the American economy. This is in
fact the clearest and most evident sign of American economic hegemony.

The next table lists the major foreign holders of U.S. t-bills as of April 2010. This list
confirms that the holders of U.S. treasury bills include almost all of the major economic
players in the world, including advanced industrial centers (such as Japan, Germany and
France), offshore financial centers (the so-called Caribbean Banking Centers), oil producers
(the so-called Oil Producers as well as Russia) and the key emerging markets (such as Brazil,
South Korea, Turkey, Mexico and Egypt), and most notably and at the top of the list, China.
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Table 10: Major Holders of U.S. Treasury Bills
County/Economic Player

Holdings in billions of USD

China

900.2

Japan

795.5

U.K.

321.2

Oil Exporters

239.3

Brazil

164.3

Caribbean Banking Centers

153.2

Hong Kong

151.8

Taiwan

126.9

Russia

113.1

Canada

81.7

Switzerland

80

Luxembourg

77.6

Germany

54.3

Thailand

46.9

Ireland

45.7

Singapore

42.4

France

38.8

S. Korea

38.7

Mexico

33.1

India

31

Turkey

27.9

Poland

24.6

Egypt

21.1

Italy

20.3

Others

327.80

Total

3,957.40

Source: Department of the Treasury/Federal Reserve Board available on http://www.treas.gov/tic/mfh.txt

The huge U.S. t-bill holdings of China are of particular significance. According to Farid
Zakaria, the structure of the world economy is characterized by the dyadic interplay between
China and the United States. On the one hand, the United States, due its unique hegemonic
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privilege, is able to basically print Dollars and issue t-bills that are in demand by the other
key economic players of the world, which has led to a wild unrivaled debt accumulation and
consumption tendency in the American economy. On the other hand, China, being the
world‟s largest emerging market economy, is committed to saving, and to accumulating its
savings by purchasing U.S. t-bills.108 In other words, China bankrolled and continues to
bankroll the American economy. As a matter of fact, America‟s consumerism fueled by the
debt accumulated from China and other key players in the world economy, has helped
catalyze Chinese growth by enabling China to furnish the American economy with more and
more consumer goods. Therefore, the more China produces, the more America consumes,
and the more China saves, and hence the more America accumulates debt, which America
uses to buy more Chinese products in a continuous cycle of production-consumption /
saving-debt accumulation.

This awkward dynamic between the world‟s most developed economy and its fastest growing
economy ensured the 1990s and the early years of the twenty-first century were an era of
growth and stability not only in the United States and China, but for most of the other major
economies of the world, perhaps except for Japan (for reasons unique to it). However, this
set-up proved to be a blessing in disguise and actually a recipe for disaster. Zakaria argues
brilliantly that it is particularly the access of the American banks and public to „cheap
money‟ that led to speculative trends and uncontrolled poisonous financial innovation within
the American economy, which ultimately led to the sub-prime mortgage crisis followed by
the recent financial meltdown in the United States, and finally resulted in a major economic
crisis not only in the American economy but all over the world, and one that could have led
108

Zakaria 2009, xvii-xx.

67

to a worldwide recession had it not been for unparalleled governmental intervention and
international coordination.109

However, the financial meltdown, although the lessons learnt from its causes and
consequences will not be soon forgotten, and although it could prove to be the beginning of
huge changes in the structure of the global economy, did not result in the crippling of the
American economy, as some anticipated. Actually, the American economy returned to real
growth in late 2009 (i.e. about one year after the meltdown in the financial markets), much
earlier than most experts anticipated. More significantly, as events unfolded, it has become
apparent that the American economy, at least in terms of output, fared much better than most
of the advanced economies. This is demonstrated in the below table, which summarizes the
annual change in gross domestic product (GDP) across the developed economies, based on
actual data and projections during the years 2008, 2009 and 2010. As evident from this data,
the performance of the American economy, measured in terms of output, has been better than
that of most of the advanced economies, especially in 2009 and even more so in 2010.

Table 11: Annual Change in GDP for Advanced Economies (% change; including
projections)
2008

2009

2010

Australia

2.38

1.33

2.96

Austria

2.05

-3.61

1.33

Belgium

0.83

-3.01

1.15

Canada

0.41

-2.64

3.14

Cyprus

3.62

-1.74

-0.69

Czech Republic

2.46

-4.29

1.68
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Denmark

-0.87

-5.07

1.20

Finland

1.21

-7.76

1.25

France

0.32

-2.19

1.52

Germany

1.25

-4.97

1.21

Greece

2.02

-1.96

-2.00

Hong Kong

2.15

-2.66

5.02

Iceland

0.96

-6.49

-3.04

Ireland

-3.04

-7.10

-1.55

Israel

4.00

0.71

3.20

Italy

-1.32

-5.04

0.84

Japan

-1.19

-5.20

1.90

Korea

2.30

0.20

4.51

Luxembourg

0.03

-4.22

2.08

Malta

2.14

-1.93

0.47

Netherlands

2.00

-3.98

1.30

New Zealand

-0.15

-1.59

2.88

Norway

1.82

-1.52

1.08

Portugal

0.04

-2.68

0.29

Singapore

1.39

-2.02

5.68

Slovak Republic

6.17

-4.66

4.10

Slovenia

3.49

-7.33

1.12

Spain

0.86

-3.64

-0.41

-0.16

-4.40

1.23

Switzerland

1.78

-1.45

1.53

Taiwan

0.73

-1.87

6.50

United Kingdom

0.55

-4.92

1.34

United States

0.44

-2.44

3.10

Average

1.23

-3.34

1.69

Sweden

Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/weodata/index.aspx

Outlook

Database

available

on:

As illustrated in the next figure, the American economy‟s performance is above average and
certainly better than most of the rest of the G7 economies, which should be taken as a sign of
the relative strength of the American economy, especially in light of the fact that the financial
crisis originated in the United States. Actually, recent events have rather confirmed that the
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American economy has absorbed the financial crisis far better than Europe has, with the
Dollar appreciating in value against the Euro and the Pound Sterling, all the more stressing
the importance of the Dollar as the global reserve currency.

Figure 21: Annual Change in GDP for Advanced Economies (% change; including
projections)
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D. AMERICAN INFLUENCE OVER KNOWLEDGE

According to Susan Strange, the ability to exert the most influence over knowledge is
another factor of structural power. Although it is rather difficult to examine this factor
empirically, as knowledge, or influence over knowledge, is difficult to express in raw figures,
two of the most appropriate indicators of this attribute of structural power are the American
share of top ranking universities and the American share of Nobel Prize laureates in natural
sciences.

With regards to top ranking universities, one of the most widely accepted rankings of top
universities worldwide is the Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU), which is
published by the Center for World-Class Universities and the Institute of Higher Education
of Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China. The ARWU is based on various objective
indicators used to rank universities worldwide, including, the number of alumni winning
prestigious international awards, the number of publications in internationally renowned
scientific journals, and the number of highly cited researchers and articles.110 The ARWU
ranking for the year 2010, as illustrated in the next table and figure, reflects the clear
dominance of American universities.

110
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Table 12: ARWU 2010 Ranking Analysis
% of Top 20
Universities

% of Top 100
Universities

% of Top 500
Universities

Australia

0.00%

3.00%

3.40%

Canada

0.00%

4.00%

4.60%

China

0.00%

0%

6.80%

Europe

10.00%

32.00%

40.40%

Japan

5.00%

5.00%

5.00%

Other

0.00%

1.00%

8.60%

Russia

0.00%

1.00%

0.40%

United States
85.00%
54.00%
30.80%
Source: Center for World-Class Universities and the Institute of Higher Education of Shanghai Jiao Tong
University, China available on http://www.arwu.org/ARWU2010.jsp

Figure 22: Analysis of ARWU 2010 Ranking
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As demonstrated above, American universities clearly dominated the ARWU 2010 ranking.
Out of the top 20 universities, 17 were American, representing 85% of the total. Even upon
expanding the list to the top 100 and top 500 universities, American universities are still
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dominant representing 54% and 30.8%, respectively. The European universities appear to be
comparable to the position of American universities only upon the expansion of the list to the
top 500 universities, which basically means that the top ranking universities worldwide are
predominately American, and that the best American universities are still unrivaled to date.
This proves that the United States still enjoys a huge influence over knowledge, as measured
by the location of the world‟s most influential scientists, researchers and research institutes in
America.

Analysis of the ARWU 2005 ranking reveals the same pattern, as illustrated in the next table
and figure.

Table 13: ARWU 2005 Ranking Analysis

% of Top 20
Universities

% of Top 100
Universities

% of Top 500
Universities

Australia

0.00%

2.00%

2.80%

Canada

0.00%

4.00%

4.60%

China

0.00%

0.00%

3.60%

Europe

10.00%

34.00%

40.60%

Japan

5.00%

5.00%

6.80%

Other

0.00%

1.00%

7.60%

Russia

0.00%

1.00%

0.40%

United States

85.00%

53.00%

33.60%

Source: Center for World-Class Universities and the Institute of Higher Education of Shanghai Jiao Tong

University, China available on http://www.arwu.org/ARWU2005.jsp
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Figure 23: Analysis of ARWU 2005 Ranking
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Analysis of the ARWU 2005 ranking confirms that the position of dominance of American
universities is persisting with little if any change, or any serious challenge from universities
from any other region in the world. To put it differently, there is no indication of a trend
suggesting the decrease of this dominance over time, at least over the recent period 20052010. The next figure illustrates that the position of American universities in the ARWU
ranking has almost remained the same between 2005 and 2010.
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Figure 24: Comparison of the 2005 & 2010 Positions of American Universities in the
ARWU Ranking
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Therefore, it is quite evident that American universities have dominated and continue to
dominate one of the most widely accepted rankings of universities worldwide, suggesting
that, at least in terms of the strength and success of its universities, America continues to
exert a substantial influence on knowledge.

A more focused approach, based entirely on the Nobel Prizes awarded in natural sciences
also reveals a similar pattern of American dominance. As illustrated in the next table and
figure, between the years 1990 and 2010 (i.e. the past two decades), 64% of the universities /
research institutes affiliated with Nobel Prize winners in natural sciences (physics, chemistry
and medicine / physiology) were American, with European universities / research institutes
coming second at only 24%. The fact that American institutions represent more than half of
the institutions affiliated with Nobel Prize winners in natural sciences during the past two
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decades is a very clear indication of how powerful the American influence over knowledge
still remains today.

Table 14: Distribution of Affiliations with Nobel Prize Winners in Natural Sciences
(1990-2010)111
Europe

37

Japan

8

Other

10

United States

97

Total

152

Figure 25: Distribution of Affiliations with Nobel Prize Winners in Natural Sciences
(1990-2010)

24%
5%
7%

64%

Europe
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Other
United States

Analysis of the ARWU rankings and the affiliations with Nobel Prize winners in natural
sciences therefore clearly demonstrates that American universities and research institutions
are still the most dominant in the world, providing the most renowned scientists and
researchers, and the most published and cited articles, especially in natural sciences and
mathematics. This demonstrates that the United States continues to exert a considerable
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Source: The Nobel Prize available on
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/lists/
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influence over knowledge, and that it enjoys a unique position in terms of this aspect of
structural power compared to any other player, including Europe and Japan, which
undoubtedly adds to the ability of the United States to sustain its hegemony in the world
economy and the international system.
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IV.

AMERICAN SOFT POWER & LEGITIMACY: A CASE STUDY

In 1991, the United States led a wide coalition of Europeans, Arabs and Americans
fighting together under U.S. command to successfully liberate Kuwait and defeat Saddam
Hussein, with the blessings of the United Nations, and even with the tacit support of the
Soviet Union, then still in existence.112 This was one of the highest points in the American
legitimate hegemony in the international system since the Second World War if not the
highest. More than two decades later, in 2003, the United States went to war for a second
time with Hussein‟s Iraq, almost unilaterally and without the participation of any major Arab
country, without participation of any of its key allies in Western Europe with the exception of
Great Britain, and without the blessings of the United Nations.113

The contrast between the multilateral UN-backed operation to liberate an occupied nation in
clear implementation of the doctrine of collective international security, and the almost
unilateral invasion of a sovereign state outside the boundaries of international law is very
clear. In fact, aside from the obvious costs in terms of human loss and heavy economic
burden of this war, and also notwithstanding that this war has resulted in greater instability in
the Middle East and increased Iranian influence in the region (contrary to American policy
objectives), the most serious loss resulting from this war, was the tarnishing of America‟s
image as the leader of the so-called „free-world‟ and the diminishment of its legitimacy on
the one hand, and the obvious rifts this war has caused between America and several of its
closest allies in Western Europe, most notably France and Germany, on the other hand.
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The 1991 liberation of Kuwait, a war were America clearly possessed the moral high ground
and acted with the approval of the United Nations as a leader of a multilateral and legitimate
effort to confront an obvious breach of international law and threat to international security,
was evidence of the stabilizing and benevolent role the United States could play through its
hegemony in the international system. As a matter of fact, the US-led coalition, having
liberated Kuwait, and soundly defeated Hussein‟s army, could have marched on to Baghdad
and toppled him from power, but it did not do so, as the United States elected to remain
within the boundaries of legitimacy and the mandate granted by the United Nations Security
Council.114 Hence, the liberation of Kuwait was a triumph for American foreign policy that
allowed the United States, as the Cold War drew to an end, to capitalize on its power base
and establish its hegemonic role on the solid foundations of legitimacy.

Conversely, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which was launched without any meaningful Arab
support, without the blessings of the United Nations and in spite of serious objections by
most of America‟s key allies in Europe, and in breach of international law, was evidence of
the potentially destabilizing role the U.S. could play through its hegemony in the
international system, if it decides to act unilaterally without due regard to the legitimacy of
its actions or the wishes of its allies. Therefore, refusal to take part in or support the invasion,
and opposition to the U.S. efforts to ensure a Security Council cover for the invasion, became
a clear policy objective for several American allies in Western Europe, notably France and
Germany.115 This ultimately led to the erosion of any meaningful legitimacy for the US-led
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invasion, in spite of the participations of other nations, most importantly, the United
Kingdom.

Jurgen Habermas summarizes the destructive effects this unilateral war, and the so-called
“War on Terror”, has had on the perception of America‟s role in the international system, and
especially on American-European relations by arguing that: “The West was not divided by
the danger of international terrorism but by policies of the current US government that ignore
international law, marginalize the United Nations and accept the inevitability of the break
with Europe”.116 According to him, the Iraq war has tarnished the reputation of the United
States, marked America‟s abandonment of its role as the protector of international rights, and
in fact signaled America‟s willingness to breach international law.117 He contends that this
invasion did not meet the legal requirements for the use of military force, as it was neither a
case of self-defense nor was it authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the
UN Charter.118

It is rather tempting to analyze the decision to invade Iraq unilaterally and its consequences
with respect to American-European relations in particular, and the international perception of
America‟s role in the international system in general, as an isolated event. However, it is
would be more meaningful to place this decision or policy objective within a wider trend in
American foreign policy, in order to better appreciate the context of this decision, and hence
the huge repercussions it has had and continues to have on American foreign policy,
American-European relations, and the international perception of America‟s hegemonic role.
116
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According to Harald Muller, the invasion of Iraq was an “expression of a particular world
view” in the American foreign policy and security circles.119 He believes that the roots of this
worldview date back to the 1970s, and can be found in the work of the “Committee on the
Present Danger”, a conservative think tank that contributed to the formulation of American
foreign policy under the Regan Administration, and which began to effect American foreign
policy, and would have continued to move it towards a more unilateral and confrontational
approach, had it not been for the sudden demise of the Soviet Union, which required the
United States to adopt a more balanced foreign policy.120 This worldview, according to him,
somewhat shaped the “Defense Planning Guidance” of 1992 formulated by the Pentagon,
during the reign of the Bush Sr. Administration, then led by Dick Cheney as the Secretary of
Defense, and became very evident in the “National Security Strategy” developed in 2002
with the advent to power of the Bush Jr. Administration.121

The underlying foundation of this essentially neo-conservative worldview is placing very
high importance on securing “freedom of action” for the United States, which particularly
manifests itself in refusing to consider further arms control and refusing to be bound by
international law.122 The basis for this approach is that the U.S. should use its sheer power to
force a particular order on the international system by actively seeking to impose democracy
and free trade without regard for unnecessary legal or institutional constraints and without
hesitation.123 Therefore, according to this approach, international law, international
organizations and international regimes could possibly assist in America‟s efforts to impose
119
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such order on the international system, but could in the meantime hamper American efforts,
in which case America should act on its own and without constraining its decision-making
ability.124

In the meantime, the United States should realize that so-called “rogue states” are a serious
threat to its hegemony and should be prevented through preventative intervention by the U.S.
from acquiring superior military capabilities (and in particular weapons of mass destruction),
and in doing so, the United States does not need to form or lead multilateral coalitions based
on “formal alliances” or “collective security institutions” such as the U.N. or NATO; instead,
participation in such preventative interventions should be on the basis of ad-hoc “coalitions
of the willing” involving “sympathetic governments”. This approach emanates from a belief
that the UN is a constraint on the American freedom of action, which is unnecessary, given
American hegemony and supremacy.125

It seems that this approach to foreign policy

basically means that the United States “no longer has to play by the rules and has the right
and the ability to impose a kind of Pax Americana on the rest of the world”.126

This new doctrine was detailed in the so-called “Project for the New American Century”, and
it became very evident that the Bush Administration is driven by the foundations of this
doctrine, especially the notions of American “exceptionalism” and “unilateralism”, and the
overall objective of the U.S. reaching the “full spectrum of dominance”.127 This monumental
change in American foreign policy was also declared and detailed in the 2002 “National
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Security Strategy”, which clearly called for the United States to intervene preemptively
against any country the U.S. believes is developing weapons of mass destruction, and even
where there is merely a potential for the development of such weapons sometime in the
future, which actually means that the United States endorsed a doctrine of “preventative war”
and not just one of “preemptive war”.128

The distinction between those two doctrines is that preemption is founded on the premise of
the existence of an imminent threat, whereas prevention pertains to the mere notion of a
potential threat, and this is an important distinction because preemptive war has the backing
of a few international law scholars, while preventative war is completely inconsistent with
international law, which allows the use of force only in self-defense or in application of the
collective security arrangements set forth in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It might be
acceptable, nevertheless, to stretch the definition of self-defense to address imminent threats
of the use of force, hence allowing for the notion of preemptive war. However, stretching
self-defense to addressing potential threats would open Pandora‟s Box, and allow for the
abuse of international law based on subjective assessments of threats, which was actually
very evident in the attempts of the United States to justify the war on Iraq on rather lame
foundations. In any case, the new American national security doctrine codified and published
in 2002 defended the legitimacy of preemptive action129, but in a manner suggesting that no
clear distinction is made between imminent and potential threats, and therefore that no clear
distinction is made between preemptive and preventative war.
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The Iraq invasion must, therefore, be analyzed within the context of this worldview or
approach to the formulation of American foreign policy and security strategy. It is not an
isolated event, and should not be perceived as such. In fact, the first few months of the Bush
Administration clearly point out to early signs of the huge effect this approach had on
American foreign policy during his eight-year reign. For example, there were clear signs,
very early on in the life of the Bush Administration, of a deliberate policy to gain freedom of
action for the U.S. by avoiding additional international commitments. The Bush
Administration, for example, refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and the
statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and even proceeded to terminate the AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.130

The September 11th attacks of 2001 won the United States sympathy all over the world, and
in particular in Europe. However, the neo-conservatives within the Bush Administration
utilized those attacks to serve their own agenda, and silence opposition from traditional
conservatives within the Administration, such as Colin Powell.131 In the meantime, European
skepticism concerning the new trends in American foreign policy did not begin with the Iraq
invasion in 2003. Although there was obvious sympathy across the Atlantic, the early record
per-9/11 of the Bush Administration did not go unnoticed, and there were even signs of
European discomfort with the “missionary” style of President Bush and his staff and the way
they sought to exploit those tragic terrorist attacks.132 In spite of the fact that almost all of the
European leaders, supported by European general public opinion, were very supportive of the
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U.S. and clearly condemned the terrorist attacks, there were some fears that the Bush
Administration would use those attacks to launch a disproportionate response.133

Nevertheless, the American retaliation against the Taliban regime was mostly acceptable. As
soon as the United States established connections between Al-Qaida and the 9/11 attacks,
almost all Europeans accepted the need to attack Al-Qaida in Afghanistan, and it is of crucial
importance to note here that the war on the Taliban regime was approved by the United
Nations.134 However, when President Bush implied that the military operations could extend
to Iraq, Iran and North Korea, the so-called “Axis of Evil”, Europe started to become
increasingly alarmed.135 It became clearer with time that the United States is keen, following
the war on the Taliban regime, to force the Iraq issue on the international agenda, which was
met with discomfort and unease by several of its European allies, most notably France.136
Europeans supported targeted attacks on terrorists in Afghanistan, but as the rhetoric and
policies changed to a global war on terror and a war between „good‟ and „evil‟, rifts between
Europeans and Americans started to emerge.137 Even before talk of the invasion of Iraq
began, concerns started to emerge that the United States was waging the so-called “War on
Terror” without a “penal code” and outside the “rule of law”, which obviously aroused many
sensitivities across Europe.138
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Actually, the plans to invade Iraq evidently pre-dated the September 11th attacks and the
launch of the so-called “War on Terror”. After the 9/11 attacks, it was quite evident that the
Bush Administration is keen on seizing the “momentum” and using this “window of
opportunity” to justify an already-existing policy objective.139 In fact, several scholars argue
that the Bush Administration was adamant on changing the American foreign policy with
respect to the Middle East region by moving it towards a more aggressive and escalatory
approach, based on the premise that this region is both the “key” and the “main threat” to its
overall objective of maintaining and expanding American hegemony.140 As explained above,
the Bush Administration subscribed to the notion that the United States is entitled to force the
“liberal world order”, which is the model perceived as compatible with American national
security, on any nation of the world without regard for notions of national sovereignty. 141
Moreover, there was an equally firm belief that resistance to the imposition of this global
project should not be dealt with only through the traditional conservative approach of
“containment” but also through “preventative wars”.142 The preventative war on Iraq was
actually conceived as an essential component of this general hegemonic project put forward
by neo-conservatives.143

However, aside from the noisy rhetoric and ideology surrounding the so-called “War on
Terror”, it is crucial to look further into the actual motives that made the invasion of Iraq
such a crucial foreign policy objective for the Bush Administration. This is rather compelling
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because analysis on the basis of the pure national interest of the U.S. suggests that this war
should have been far from attractive.

To begin with, the Bush Administration must have been aware that the potential of conflict in
the Middle East would result in compromising oil price stability, at least on the short term.144
In addition, the United States already enjoyed a significant degree of control over the Gulf
region and hence over global oil production through a mixture of a strong alliance with Saudi
Arabia and the “dual containment” of Iraq and Iran.145 Furthermore, rising global demand for
oil did not threaten American hegemony. In fact, on the contrary, rising oil demand, coupled
with the unique political and military influence of the U.S. in the Gulf region, actually served
to cement American hegemony.146 Most importantly, a largely depleted Iraq, served U.S.
interests in a multitude of ways, most importantly by helping contain and check Iranian
influence, and also by justifying American military presence in the Gulf region.147 Therefore,
from a pure national interest perspective, there is no clear justification for the importance the
Bush Administration attributed to the invasion of Iraq. This is of course not to mention the
potential risks to American national interests emanating from the negative reception by the
international community of such a controversial action, which may have not been fully
realized by American policy makers at the time they connived of this idea.

In this regard, Raymond Hinnebusch attempts to explain the attitude of the Bush
Administration towards the invasion of Iraq from a different perspective by analyzing the
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internal dynamics within the Bush Administration itself. He argues that this policy objective,
rather than serving American national interests, served the “particular interests of the very
distinctive ruling coalition” inside the Bush Administration.148 He believes that the election
of President Bush marked a “power shift” within the United States from a wide coalition of
the “Treasury”, “Commerce”, “Wall Street” and “mainstream corporate power” to what he
calls a “much narrower military-oil complex of interests”.149 He adds that rise of George W.
Bush to power marked the “convergence” of the neo-conservative, Zionist affiliated, lobby
and the “arms/oil” lobby, especially with regards to policy concerning the Middle East, with
the arms/oil lobby giving-up its traditional inclination to “appease” Arab oil-rich regimes in
favor of the more aggressive approach of the neo-conservative lobby.150

According to Hinnebusch, the main reason for the convergence of the interests of the neoconservative and arms lobbies is their common goal of increasing military expenditure,
which was evident in their cooperation to move the Regan Administration in the direction of
starting an “arms race” with the USSR.151 He adds that those two lobbies resumed their
collaboration in the 1990s in the so-called “Project for the New American Century”, which
was based on forwarding American hegemony, and increasing American military supremacy,
while committing to the unconditional support of Israel, and which has as its “centerpiece”
bringing about forceful “regime change” in Iraq.152 As for the oil lobby, he argues that
probably the best explanation for its support of this military adventure lies in seeking direct
ownership and control of Iraqi oil on the one hand, and the short term interest of increasing
148
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profits as a result of the increase in the oil prices expected to occur as a consequence of the
war, on the other hand.153 Hinnebusch even argues that the war might have been perceived as
serving the interests of a wider class of American capitalists keen on reinvigorating the
American economy through the inflationary effect a rise in oil prices could have on the
economy.154

Hinnebusch also stresses on the key and central role played by neo-conservatives in
advocating the invasion of Iraq as a central foreign policy objective for the Bush
Administration. He contends that the neo-conservatives are closely affiliated with Zionism,
and that they hence place huge importance on preserving the national interests of Israel and
especially its expansion through settlements.155 This policy obviously contradicts with the
U.S. national interest in preserving its control over oil production, as a balanced approach is,
therefore, required of the United States with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, in order to
accommodate the interests of the Arab oil-producing states, especially Saudi Arabia.156 The
United States, while formulating its policy towards the Middle East, sought to balance
between the interests of Israel and Saudi Arabia, and accordingly was always keen on the
continuation of the peace process, prompting it to sometimes be critical of aggressive Israeli
policies, especially concerning the expansion of settlements. The neo-conservatives
attempted to end the need for such a balancing act through the invasion of Iraq resulting in
gaining direct access to oil, therefore ensuring American strategic control of the oil market,
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without requiring the United States to make any concessions to Arab oil-rich states in a
manner potentially affecting its full and unconditional support of Israel.157

Regardless of the plausibility or possibility of the foregoing explanations, it is rather clear
that the Bush Administration, for reasons that are not entirely consistent with American
national interests, was adamant on the invasion of Iraq even before the September 11th
attacks and the beginning of the so-called “War on Terrorism”. It is also clear that, in spite of
the notions of American “exceptionalism” and “unilateralism” pervasive in the foreign policy
and national security doctrine applied by the Bush Administration, it attempted to exploit the
September 11th attacks, and the resulting international sympathy with the U.S., to somehow
justify the invasion of Iraq and gain some measure of legitimacy for this war. Although
several voices inside the Bush Administration desired for the United States to commence
operations against Iraq without the approval of the United Nations or the support of NATO,
President Bush decided to seek the support of the UN, and hence rather than focusing on the
real policy objective of bringing about regime change in Iraq by force, the U.S. had to justify
military action against Iraq on other grounds, which prompted the Bush Administration to
refer to Iraq‟s potential possession of weapons of mass destruction, building on a history of
Security Council resolutions addressing the issue.158

In the beginning, the United States used Iraq‟s refusal to allow the UN Special Commission
(UNSCOM) weapons inspectors back into Iraq to confirm that Iraq has destroyed its
weapons of mass destruction as a pretext for the invasion; however, negotiations between
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Iraq and the United Nations resulted in Iraq announcing in the late summer of 2002 its
acceptance of the return of the inspectors under the newly formed UN Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).159 It should be noted that the
UNSCOM inspectors withdrew from Iraq in late 1998 before a four-day US bombing
campaign launched by the Clinton Administration, which allowed Iraq to refuse their return
claiming that they were involved in espionage activities.160

Nevertheless, and in spite of Iraq‟s announcement of the return of weapons inspectors, and as
preparations were already underway for the invasion, the United States began discrediting
UN inspection efforts, which were at the time generally believed to be successful, and as it
turned out after the invasion were confirmed to have indeed been efficient.161 The United
States was keen on forcing the Iraq issue on the international agenda, insisting that the risk
that Saddam Hussein would supply terrorists groups with weapons of mass destruction out of
his arguably still existing arsenal could not be tolerated, and by the summer of 2002, the
Bush Administration was actively seeking to mobilize the support of its European allies and
the United Nations for military action against Iraq on those grounds.162

When concrete evidence of Iraq‟s possession of weapons of mass destruction appeared
elusive, the Bush Administration tried to employ another tactic by attempting to link Saddam
Hussein to Al-Qaida.163 This proved to be even a more outrageous attempt that did not
resonate well with the international community, particularly that the ideological differences
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between the decidedly secular Hussein and the decidedly Islamist Bin Laden made any true
potential for such cooperation rather inconceivable.164 The Bush Administration could only
cite the “mutual antipathy” for the U.S. that Iraq and Al-Qaida share to quite lamely explain
that their cooperation is possible, failing to provide any material evidence of their
association.165

When the issue was actually first discussed in the Security Council in late 2002, France and
Russia, with the help of other countries, were successful in introducing substantial changes to
the draft resolution proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom, such that the
resolution adopted in November 2002 fell short of explicitly authorizing the use of military
force against Iraq.166 With time, it became clearer that the U.S. would launch the invasion in
spite of the lack of evidence of Iraq‟s possession of weapons of mass destruction or of its
alleged ties with Al-Qaida, regardless of the absence of a UN cover, and notwithstanding
opposition from most of the international community, including many of its key allies.

As the U.S. proceeded to obtain international approval of its plans, the European
governments were split on the issue. The United Kingdom, under Prime Minister Blair, was
quick to announce its support of the U.S. It was joined by a number of other governments
that were either right of center and/or ruling nations traditionally “Atlantic” in their
orientation, such as Italy, Spain, Holland, Denmark and Ireland, and also joined by most of
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which relied heavily on the U.S. for their
164
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security and independence from Russia.167 On the other hand, France and Germany were
clearly opposed to any prospect of military action against Iraq outside the umbrella of
international law, and they were supported within the European Union by Belgium and
Greece, and also joined by the neutral Sweden, Austria and Finland. 168 The positions of
France and Germany, which are the most important nations in Continental Europe, the
central countries in the European Union, and two of the most important allies of the United
States, merit some closer attention.

With regards to France, President Chirac was firmly supported by the French public opinion
in his objections to the planned invasion and efforts to justify it.169 This position was
consistent with the French foreign policy objectives based on the premise that international
affairs should be conducted in a “multipolar” and “multilateral” manner, and that
consequently the recognition of America‟s prominent role in the international system does
not mean that the U.S. can ignore international rules and norms.170 France is not traditionally
opposed to the use of force as a matter of principle, and in the Iraq case did not necessarily
rule out this possibility; however, given the lack of evidence of a clear threat, it was more
important for France to stress on the importance of legitimacy and international law than
support its ally.171
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As for Germany, it appeared clear that the united Germany, now at the heart of the European
Union, was far more European than Atlantic. As a matter of fact, Chancellor Shroder was
quite vocal in explicitly opposing the war, stressing that Germany would not contribute
neither militarily nor economically to the war effort, and even if it was approved by the
United Nations.172 As events unfolded, this position proved to be a decisive factor in the
German elections held in the fall of 2002, which was closely won by the socialist-green
coalition he belonged to.173

The war was not only opposed by the governments of several key European allies of the
United States; it was also opposed by the general public opinion throughout Europe and even
within the countries that officially supported the invasion. For example, according to opinion
polls, 90 percent of the Spanish population, 87 percent of the Italian population, 79 percent of
the Polish population and 55 percent of the British population, were against the war. 174 As a
case in point, on 15 February 2003, across hundreds of cities throughout the world, nearly 10
million people took to the streets demonstrating against the then apparently imminent war,
including about 1 million people in London alone, noting that the United Kingdom was the
only meaningful ally of the U.S. in the war.175

The result of this worldwide opposition was very clear when the United States returned to the
Security Council seeking UN approval for military action against Iraq. The U.S faced clear
172
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opposition from Russia and France, and also by Germany, which was then a non-permanent
member of the Security Council. Even more notably, six non-permanent members of the
Security Council, other than Germany (Chile, Mexico, Cameroon, Guinea, Angola and
Pakistan), opposed the American proposal.176 The opposition by those six non-permanent
members was a true diplomatic humiliation for the U.S. and a crushing blow to its
international prestige, given that some of those countries are traditionally viewed as falling
within the direct sphere of influence of the United States. 177 The historical significance of
this incident cannot be stressed more, as this was a very rare instance of the United States
failing to get the United Nations to endorse an action of central importance to American
foreign policy.178 It was the first time in the history of the UN that Western allies of the U.S.
openly competed with it for the votes of non-permanent members of the Security Council in
order to ensure an American proposed resolution cannot see the light.179

After its failure to obtain approval by the Security Council, the United States announced that
it would seek such approval for a second time but that it would proceed with military action
against Iraq irrespective of whether or not a Security Council resolution is passed approving
such action.180 This was an attempt to pressure the international community into accepting a
resolution, as a compromise, in order to preserve the prestige of the United Nations. This was
soon met with a retaliatory veto threat not only by Russia but also by France. 181 The
threatened French veto is also of significant historical importance, as it is a very rare instance
176
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of a veto threat by one of America‟s allies enjoying a permanent seat on the Security Council
concerning a resolution proposal supported by the U.S.

The rifts between the United States and several of its key allies in Europe were not confined
to the United Nations, as they also manifested themselves within the NATO context. An
internal NATO crisis surfaced when Turkey requested the deployment of Patriot missiles for
its protection from potential Iraqi attacks, only to be met with opposition from France and
also Germany.182 Although the crisis was ultimately averted due to a procedural
circumvention of the French-German opposition, the extension of the Western divide on the
Iraq war to the NATO alliance was another setback for American foreign policy. 183 As
several key European states solemnly opposed America‟s willingness, under the Bush
Administration, to act unilaterally and without the approval of the United Nations, they were
also signaling to the U.S. that NATO can only be used after a European-American consensus
is built, and that absent such a consensus, America would indeed be forced to act
unilaterally.184

The American decision to almost unilaterally invade Iraq without UN approval, in breach of
international law, and without the support of NATO and most of its European allies,
significantly undermined its legitimacy as a leader of the „free world‟, tarnishing its image in
an unprecedented manner and severely jeopardizing its creditability. This resulted in a
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crushing blow to America‟s legitimacy and in an unprecedented erosion of American soft
power.

First, the U.S. was unable to pass a resolution approving the invasion through the Security
Council, and was met with opposition by seven of the non-permanent members of the
Security Council, thereby shooting down its proposal without the need for a veto by the
opposing permanent members. This was a severe blow to American prestige as most of those
states were developing countries, traditionally assumed to be within the American sphere of
influence. Second, the U.S. was firmly opposed inside the UN by two of its most important
allies, namely, France and Germany, that both competed with the U.S. for the votes of the
non-permanent members of the Security Council, in a truly historic scene. Third, the U.S.
was faced with the prospect of a French veto of a resolution proposed by the U.S. on an issue
of central importance to the U.S., again another historic challenge of the American
hegemonic role. Fourth, as an even more meaningful challenge of American hegemony,
France and Germany took their opposition of the war to the NATO level threatening in the
Turkey crisis to defy the United States within NATO itself, hence rocking the foundations of
American hegemony in the context of transatlantic cooperation.

This highlights the fact that America soft power is tied firmly to the legitimacy, or perceived
legitimacy, of its actions. The U.S. is not unconstrained in the formulation of its foreign
policy and national security strategy, and a doctrine based on the notion of American
“exceptionalism” and “unilateralism” would result in the erosion of American soft power.
97

The U.S., in order to count on the support of its allies or even the countries falling within its
sphere of influence, must ensure that its actions are perceived as legitimate by the
international community, and hence America should act within the boundaries of
international law, and should be engaged in international organizations and regimes. It cannot
simply force its own vision on the other actors within the international system and global
economy, as they are both willing and able to defy the United States, if its actions are
perceived as illegitimate, and the U.S. cannot afford such defiance because it would expose
the contradictions between American interests and those of other actors, and therefore
threaten the foundations of the American hegemony based on legitimate domination.

98

V.

Conclusion

The United States possesses a considerable degree of structural power in the
international system and the global economy, as (a) it continues to control or, at least,
influence the security of many key actors in the international arena, most notably in Western
Europe, the Far East and the oil-rich Gulf region; (b) as American-based corporations,
especially in the banking and information technology sectors, dominate the global economy
and hence dictate the structure of global production; (c) as the United States, through the
extraordinary position of the U.S. Dollar as a global reserve currency, controls the structure
of international finance and credit; and (d) as American scientists, inventors, universities,
research institutions and corporations exert a considerable degree of influence over global
knowledge and culture.

However, as demonstrated by the War on Iraq (2003) and the events that preceded it, most
notably the rifts between America and many of its closest allies in the West, the United
States cannot afford to act unilaterally and outside international regimes and in breach of
international law. In order to maintain its hegemonic role, the U.S. cannot risk deliberately
eroding its soft power in the international community, especially vis-à-vis the governments
and peoples of its closest allies.

To act in a unilateral manner and without concern for the legitimacy, or perceived legitimacy,
of its actions, America would be planting the seeds for the end of its legitimate domination of
the international system and the global economy, and would thereby effectively move from a
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position of integral hegemony, where its interests are aligned with those of most of the other
actors in the international system, to a position of declining hegemony, where its interests are
in obvious contradiction with those of several other key actors in the international system
prompting them to challenge it.

Such change of position, from integral to declining hegemony, will ultimately, and with the
passage of time, expose the U.S. to serious challenges that, regardless of its obvious
structural power, it will not be able to meet simultaneously on its own. The potential for the
loss or decline of American power and hegemony does not therefore emanate from a decline
in America‟s relative capabilities or sources of power. On the contrary, the U.S. still enjoys a
unique position in international affairs that it can sustain with its current capabilities
regardless of their decline relative to the capabilities of other powers or actors.

It is actually the foreign policy of the U.S. that can cement or deplete its hegemonic position.
A foreign policy that is based on expanding and capitalizing on America‟s soft power would
preserve American hegemony and make the most of America‟s structural power. Conversely,
a foreign policy that depletes and destroys America‟s soft power would expose the U.S. to
challenges that, in due course, would erode its structural power and waste its power
resources. Therefore, the central debate concerning the longevity of American hegemony
should actually be a debate on American foreign policy, or on how the U.S. should best
manage its power resources in the international arena, and should not by any means remain
an empty purely empirical analysis of the absolute or relative decline or persistence of the
material indicators of American power.
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The United States does not need to manage the decline in its power resources because it
retains a considerable degree of structural power that is enough to ensure its continued
hegemony. However, the United States needs to realize the limitations of its structural power,
which allow it a degree of legitimate domination of the international system and global
economy, if, and to the extent that, American policies are in harmony with the perquisites of
legitimacy. As such, the U.S. can maintain minimal hegemony in the international system, as
long as American policies are formulated and applied within a framework that adheres to a
general policy of cooperation with other key actors within important international
institutions, especially the United Nations and NATO, and the boundaries of international
law. American unilateralism, on the contrary, would result in the alienation of America‟s
allies, especially in Western Europe, and effectively erode America‟s soft power.

Therefore, the U.S., although still enjoying a hegemonic position, cannot operate in an
unconstrained or uninhibited manner, and should seek to align its interests with those of the
other key actors in the international system and global economy, or at least avoid any acute
contradictions between those interests. This is especially important with respect to the
American allies in Western Europe, as the most valuable source of American soft power is
the image of America as the rightful leader of the so-called „free-world‟.

The tarnishing of this image by embarking on unilateral foreign policy objectives, without
due regard to the requirements of meaningful transatlantic cooperation, can potentially end
the current phase of American legitimate domination of the international system, and not
necessarily through a united Europe directly confronting the United States, but rather by
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gradually isolating the United States, denying it resort to the capabilities of its most
important allies in managing the international system and global economy, and hence
exhausting its own capabilities and stretching them to the limit.

In the meantime, American policies should not deviate from the normative foundations of
Western philosophy and culture, in particular placing very high importance on adherence to
the rule of law in international relations, as otherwise the U.S. would risk exposing itself to
resistance from many of its closest allies, let alone its adversaries. In order to preserve its
hegemony, the U.S. must therefore apply a foreign policy doctrine based on clear normative
values, and seek to uphold those values through cooperation with American allies in various
international institutions. Those institutions are, therefore, not superfluous by any means;
rather, they are required to preserve the legitimacy of American foreign policy objectives.

In conclusion, one can safely argue that American hegemony is not on the decline from the
structural power perspective. To put things simply, America still holds the highest cards in
the international „poker game‟. However, America must avoid playing the „hand‟ poorly by
depleting its soft power and undermining the legitimacy, or perceived legitimacy, of its
actions. It is actually the anxiety over the decline in American power (and the unilateralism,
isolationism or expansionism this is often translated into in terms of foreign policy) that
would expose weaknesses in the power base of the U.S.

No matter how strong or dominant the United States might currently be, it cannot unilaterally
address several challenges to its hegemonic role simultaneously, nor unilaterally confront all
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of the problems in the international arena. America needs to cooperate, for example, with
many actors within the international system, whether close allies or not, in order to prevent
the horizontal proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and confront the security threats
of radical Islamist militant groups, in order to manage crises in the global economy, and in
order to address the threats posed by global climatic change.

Therefore, in order to propel America into a new phase of hegemony, American foreign
policy should aim at more openness and cooperation with the rest of the world, and more
engagement in international organizations and institutions, or to use Robert Cox‟s conception
of hegemony, America should couple its raw material power with norms and institutions to
achieve true hegemony. In fact, the more the U.S. resorts to brute force or naked power, as
was the case in the Iraq invasion, the less hegemonic it actually is and the less hegemonic it
will ultimately become.

As such, the change in the foreign policy outlook of the United States during the current term
of the Obama Administration, as highlighted in the National Security Strategy of 2010, is a
step in the right direction, and can begin to restore America‟s position of legitimate
domination, which it had enjoyed previously, especially after the end of the Cold War, and
which was somewhat damaged by the Bush Administration, especially as a consequence of
the decision to unilaterally invade Iraq in 2003. The National Security Strategy of 2010
actually refers explicitly to themes such as “Strengthen the Power of Our Example”, “Ensure
Strong Alliances” and “Strengthen Institutions and Mechanisms for Cooperation”, which
point out to a shift in American foreign policy towards more emphasis on the importance of
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values and norms, improving American soft power, restoring meaningful cooperation with
allies, and working through international institutions.185 It remains to be seen whether this
actually marks a change in doctrine or a mere change in rhetoric, and it remains to be
analyzed how this change, regardless of its nature, is going to affect American hegemony
within the coming few years.

185

Available on http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.

104

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brilmayer, Lea. 1994. American Hegemony: Political Morality in a One-Super Power World. New Haven and
London: Yale University Press.
Carfuny, Alan W. 1990. A Gramscian Concept of Declining Hegemony: Stages of U.S. Power and the Evolution of
International Economic Relations. In World Leadership and Hegemony, edited by David P. Rapkin, 71-97. Boulder
and London: Lynee Rienner Publishers.
Coicaud, Jean Marc, Gandois, Helene and Rutgers, Lysette. 2006. Explaining France‟s Opposition to the War
Against Iraq. In The Iraq Crisis and World Order: Structural, Institutional and Normative Challenges, edited by
Ramesh Thakur and Pal Singh Sidhu. Tokyo, New York and Paris: United Nations University Press.
Conynbeare, John A. C. 1984. Public Goods, Prisoners‟ Dilemmas and the International Political Economy. In
International Studies Quarterly, 28, 5-22.
Cortright, David. 2006. The World Says No: The Global Movement Against War in Iraq. In The Iraq Crisis and
World Order: Structural, Institutional and Normative Challenges, edited by Ramesh Thakur and Pal Singh Sidhu.
Tokyo, New York and Paris: United Nations University Press.
Cowhey, Peter F. and Long, Edward. 1983. Testing Theories of Regime Change: Hegemonic Decline or Surplus
Capacity? In International Organization, 37 (2), 157-88.
Cox, Robert W. 1981. Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory. In
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 10 (2), 126-55.
Ferguson, Niall. 2003. Think Again: Power. In Foreign Policy, March/April 2003, 18-24.
Fitt, Yann, Faire, Alexandre and Vigier, Jean-Pierre. 1980. The World Economic Crisis: US Imperialism at Bay,
translated by Michael Pallis. London: Zed Press.
Gowa, Joanne. 1989. Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods, and Small Groups: An Epitaph for Hegemonic
Stability. In World Politics, XLI, 307-24.
Habermas, Jurgen. 2006. The Divided West, edited and translated by Ciaran Cronin. Cambridge and Malden: Polity
Press Ltd.
Hinnebusch, Raymond. 2006. Hegemonic Stability Theory Reconsidered: Implications of the Iraq War. In The Iraq
War: Causes and Consequences, edited by Rick Fawn and Raymond Hinnebusch. Boulder and London: Lynne
Rienner Publishers.
Hopkins, Terence K. and Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1996. The World-System: Is There a Crisis? In The Age of
Transition: Trajectory of the World-Systems 1945-2025, edited by Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein,
1-13. London: Zed Books.

105

Huldt, Bo. 2005. The Iraq War and the Transatlantic Relationship. In The Iraq War: European Perspectives on
Politics, Strategy and Operations, edited by Jan Hallenberg and Hakan Karlsson. London and New York:
Routledge.
Ikenberry, G. John and Kupchan, Charles A. 1990. The Legitimation of Hegemonic Power. In World Leadership
and Hegemony, edited by David P. Rapkin, 21-49. Boulder and London: Lynee Rienner Publishers.
Kashmeri, Sarwar A. 2007. America and Europe After 9/11 and Iraq: The Great Divide. Westport and London:
Praeger Security International.
Kennedy, Paul. 1987. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to
2000. New York: Vintage Books.
Kennedy, Paul. 1991. On the “Natural” Size of Great Powers. In Proceedings of the American Philosophical
Society, 135 (4): 485-9.
Keohane, Robert O. 1980. The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes,
1967-1977. In Change in the International System, edited by Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson and Alexander
L. George, 131-63. Boulder: Westview.
Kindleberger, Charles P. 1976. Systems of International Economic Organization. In Money and the Coming World
Order, edited by David P. Calleo, 31-4. New York: New York University Press.
Krasner, Stephan. 1976. State Power and the Structure of International Trade. In World Politics, XVIII, 317-47.
Lake, David. „British and American Hegemony Compared: Lessons for the Current Era of Decline‟ in Michael Fry
(ed.) History, the White House and the Kremlin: Statesmen as Historians, (London: Pinter, 1991), p.106.
Lawson, Fred H. 1983. Hegemony and the Structure of International Trade Reassessed: A View from Arabia. In
International Organization, 38 (2), 317-37.
Lundestad, Geir. 2003. The United States and Western Europe Since 1945: From “Empire” by Invitation to
Transatlantic Drift. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Mearsheimer, John J. 1995. A Realist Reply. In International Security, 20 (1), 82-93.
Modleski, George. 1990. Global Leadership: End Game Scenarios. In World Leadership and Hegemony, edited by
David P. Rapkin, 241-257. Boulder and London: Lynee Rienner Publishers.
Morgenthau, H. 1965. Politics Among Nations. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Muller, Harald. 2006. Iraq and World Order: A German Perspective. In The Iraq Crisis and World Order:
Structural, Institutional and Normative Challenges, edited by Ramesh Thakur and Pal Singh Sidhu. Tokyo, New
York and Paris: United Nations University Press.
Nye (Jr.), Joseph S. 1990. American Strategy after Bipolarity. In International Affairs, 66 (3): 513-21.
106

Nye (Jr.), Joseph S. 2002-3. Limits of American Power. In Political Science Quarterly, 117 (4): 545-59.
Nye (Jr.), Joseph S. 2003. The Velvet Hegemon. In Foreign Policy, 136: 74-5.
Pashakhanlou, Arash Heydarian. Comparing and Contrasting Classical Realism and Neorealism: A Reexamination of Hans Morgenthau’s and Kenneth Waltz’s Theories of International Relations. Available on
http://www.e-ir.info/?p=1921.
Snidal, Duncan. 1985. The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory. In International Organization, 39 (4): 579-614.
Stein, Arthur A. 1984. The Hegemon‟s Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic
Order. In International Organization, 38 (2), 355-86.
Rapkin, David P. 1990. The Contested Concept of Hegemonic Leadership. In World Leadership and Hegemony,
edited by David P. Rapkin, 1-21. Boulder and London: Lynee Rienner Publishers.
Robinson, William I. 1996. Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Russet, Bruce. 1985. The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead? In
International Organization, 39 (2): 207-31.
Strange, Susan. 1982. Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis. In International Organization, 36 (2):
479-96.
Strange, Susan. 1987. The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony. In International Organization, 41 (4): 551-74.
Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1996. The Global Picture, 1945-90. In The Age of Transition: Trajectory of the WorldSystems 1945-2025, edited by Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, 209-26. London: Zed Books.
Waltz, K. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Zakaria, Farid. 2009. The Post-American World. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company.
Zunes, Stephen. 2006. The United States: Belligerent Hegemon. In The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences,
edited by Rick Fawn and Raymond Hinnebusch. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

107

